Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation\u27s Feel-Good Governance Giveaways by Groshoff, David
 
233 
CONTREPRENEURSHIP?  EXAMINING SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE LEGISLATION’S FEEL-GOOD 
GOVERNANCE GIVEAWAYS 
David Groshoff* 
I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade 
for the public good.
1 
 
—Adam Smith 
 
This Article builds on my existing research regarding theoretical 
corporate agents—management—who wield greater power over the 
enterprise than the enterprise’s owners.  For over a century, the U.S. has 
witnessed a separation of shareholders’ ability to control their agents and 
extract economic interests from the businesses they purportedly own. 
Economist Milton Friedman proposed in 1970 that businesses are 
amoral persons with a sole responsibility to maximize profits, presuming 
that shareholders agree.  Since then, however, theories of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (“CSR”), social enterprise, and other stakeholder-driven 
corporate policies have gained traction. 
As Friedman’s questionable economic views took hold in business 
school texts in the early 1980s by advancing a mistaken notion that all 
corporations aimed to maximize shareholder profit, other theorists pushed 
to enact “constituency statutes.”  These laws permitted management to 
consider non-owners in corporate decision making, regardless of 
shareholders’ wishes. 
Although many constituency statutes passed, many economic 
 
* David Groshoff, Ed.M., Harvard University; J.D., The Ohio State University; M.B.A., 
Northern Kentucky University; B.A. Indiana University.  I thank Dr. Effendi Leonard for 
his input, Western State College of Law Reference Librarian Scott Frey, as well as my team 
of research assistants and attorney reviewers for their diligent help: Heidi Timmerman, Esq., 
Ashley Felando, Esq., Kurtis Urien, Esq., Jared Willis, Esq., Daren Gotlieb, Esq., Ryan 
Wallace, Alex Nguyen, and Monique Midose.  I am grateful for the input of Professor 
Haskell Murray of Belmont University’s School of Business.  Finally, I also thank Steve 
Goodman, David Allan Coe, and John Prine. "I'm appreciative of the efforts of the editors at 
Pennsylvania's Business Law Journal for their helpful assistance.” 
1.   Adam Smith, Of Systems of Political Economy, in 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
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progressives remained dissatisfied.  These advocates helped launch new—
albeit opaque and divergent—ideas of social enterprise legislation (“SEL”).  
Since 2008, several states have passed SEL that authorizes or requires that 
a social benefit inure to non-owner stakeholders. 
But some companies merely function like those authorized by SEL, as 
corporate owners often authorize management to take socially-beneficial 
action in charters and bylaws.  This Article thus suggests that SEL is a 
“con” led by entrepreneurs called “contrepreneurs.”  As I use the term, 
”contrepreneurs” are those who possess and advance interests opposed to 
equity holders, and disregard longstanding entrepreneurial and corporate 
governance tenets. 
While SEL has a potentially charitable aim, I argue that 
contrepreneurs have advanced a deceptive maze of needless SEL using 
ethically-questionable marketing.  In addition to this deception, 
contrepreneurs have attempted to silence political and legal counter 
narratives, and have created self-reinforcing laws to support a cottage 
industry that serves their own interests, not society’s.  That cottage industry 
and SEL may allow managers to engage in value-destructive and morally 
hazardous behaviors that would otherwise lead to liability claims under 
traditional corporate law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2008, Vermont became the first state to pass Social Enterprise 
Legislation (“SEL”), which creates new business associations.
2
  Since then, 
four brand-managed business types, all traceable to SEL, came into 
existence:  (1) low-profit limited liability companies (“L3Cs”); (2) benefit 
corporations; (3) flexible purpose corporations (“FPCs”); and (4) B Lab-
certified “B Corps”.
3
  In any of its forms, however, SEL not only represents 
unnecessary and confused solutions to corporate evils that never existed, 
but also creates myriad future troubles for entrepreneurs and investors. 
Law review articles typically attempt to accomplish two broad goals:  
(1) identify a specific socio-legal problem and (2) articulate novel 
descriptive or prescriptive claims to support solutions to the identified 
problems.
4
  However, this Article employs a backwards design in 
articulating, advancing, and defending its thesis that SEL is an unneeded 
and aggravating purported solution to a nonexistent corporate problem, that 
corporations allegedly are hindered from pursuing social purposes.
5
  This 
Article describes concerns with SEL and demonstrates how SEL 
 
 2.  2007 Vt. ALS 106. 
 3.  See infra Part II (discussing each entity type in detail). 
 4.  EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT 
NOTES, SEMINAR PAPERS, AND GETTING ON LAW REVIEW 9, 15-18 (Foundation Press 3d ed. 
2007). 
 5.  Backwards design is an educational tool employed by many teachers.  See, e.g., 
GRANT WIGGINS & JAY MCTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN 7-19 (1998).  Assuming that 
a problem existed at all, then it was confined to a situation in which a public corporation 
underwent an auction to the highest bidder following a hostile takeover attempt.  See 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (describing 
the narrow context in which directors’ fiduciary duties are exclusively to maximize 
shareholder value); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-land, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3311-13 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing scenarios where Delaware 
courts have recognized a duty to maximize shareholder value). 
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structurally exacerbates quasi-agency relationships, the most important of 
which is a business owner’s ability to control management and extract 
economic interest from the enterprise.  Because no need for SEL-related 
business organizations exists, this Article posits that SEL  is a con in the 
name of otherwise altruistic and consciously capitalistic entrepreneurial 
enterprises and investors. 
This Article thus employs the term “contrepreneur” to describe SEL 
proponents.  “The term ‘social entrepreneur’ [itself] was coined or at least 
popularized in the 1980s by [founder and CEO of Ashoka, a network of 
social entrepreneurs] Bill Drayton [who]  .  .  .  . noted, ‘[t]hink back 25 
years ago, there was no phrase [‘]social entrepreneur[‘]—we made it up.’”
6
   
“Social entrepreneur” is not the only SEL term of questionable 
provenance.  “Corporate Social Responsibility,” “Corporate Stakeholders,” 
“Corporate Governance,” and “fiduciary duty” also have nebulous origins.   
First, CSR “has no clear, readily accepted definition.”
7
  “Stakeholder” is 
also an unclear term in need of a definition.  Professor Stephen Bainbridge 
asserts that “[t]he name [corporate] ‘stakeholders’ reportedly originated . . . 
as a descriptive term for ‘those groups without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist.’”
8
  As for the term “corporate 
governance,” Professor Jonathan R. Macey indicates that it “is surely the 
most overused and poorly defined in the lexicon of business.”
9
  Finally, 
fiduciary duty has conflicting definitions.  The Third Restatement of 
Agency defines “fiduciary,” but it states that corporate directors represent 
only metaphorical—not legal—agents, who owe duties of care and loyalty 
 
 6.  J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, 
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 n.7 (2011) (emphasis added) (internal citation 
omitted).  Ashoka aims “[t]o support social entrepreneurs who are leading and collaborating 
with changemakers, in a team of teams model that addresses the fluidity of a rapidly 
evolving society.”  Vision and Mission, ASHOKA (Nov. 24, 2013), 
https://www.ashoka.org/visionmission.   
7. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2011); see also C.A. Harwell Wells, 
The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-
First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002) (providing a detailed history of CSR). 
8. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 973 n.11 (1992) (quoting R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, 
Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983)); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the 
Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 3 (2002) (defining 
“stakeholders” as “nonshareholder corporate constituents, such as employees, customers, 
suppliers, and local communities in which the corporation does business,” again citing 
Freeman & Reed, at 88, 89). 
9.   JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 
279 n.1 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
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to the corporation, but not necessarily the owners.
10
  I will use the terms 
“stockholders,” “shareholders,” “equityholders,” and “owners” 
interchangeably in this Article. 
Despite the marketing and brand managing of SEL to investors and 
legislators, the new corporate entities traceable to SEL currently have legal, 
financial, and social costs that materially outweigh these entities’ purported 
benefits.  Corporate governance perhaps represents the most meaningful 
way in which SEL may constitute a cost rather than a benefit to the broader 
U.S. and global economy.  In particular, SEL legitimizes a further 
weakening of shareholders’ ability to enforce control over management and 
the shareholders’ capacity to extract economic value from the corporation 
that they theoretically own. 
Milton Friedman famously wrote in 1970 that corporations faced no 
requirement to solely maximize shareholder value, so long as the owners of 
the corporation agreed with alternative corporate purposes and the business 
did not engage in fraud or deception.
11
  The “key point,” Friedman argued, 
was that a corporate “manager
12
 is the agent
13
 of the individuals who own 
the corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and [the 
 
10.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 8.01 (2006); see also David Groshoff, 
Would “Junkholder Primacy” Reduce Junk Corporate Governance?, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 
59, 74 n.61 (2012) (quoting Antonin Scalia, who stated that “‘to say that a man is a fiduciary 
only begins [the] analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry  .  .  . [including] [w]hat 
obligations . . . he owe[s] as a fiduciary’”). 
 11.  Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. 
12.   The Delaware Corporate Code provides that directors as well as managers may 
manage a corporation.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) (stating that “[t]he business 
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or 
in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
13.   Whether an actor is an agent, particularly in the context of a director acting on 
behalf of shareholders, is not always clear and the contours of agency have been hotly 
debated through the years.  See note 18 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY, §§ 1.01, 8.01 (stating that “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that 
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that 
the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the 
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act” and “[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty 
to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency 
relationship.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY ch. 1, topic 1, § 1, and ch. 13, topic 1, 
tit C, § 387 (1958) (“(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the 
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. (2) The one for whom action is to 
be take is the principal. (3) The one who is to act is the agent[,] and “[u]nless otherwise 
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the 
principal in all matters connected with his agency.”).  The Second Restatement of Agency 
existed when Friedman wrote The Social Responsibility of Business. 
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manager’s] primary responsibility” runs to the business owners.
14
 
Friedman explains that if a corporate manager uses corporate assets to 
fulfill a social responsibility to non-owner stakeholders, and the corporate 
owners believe that social responsibility does not serve a legitimate 
corporate purpose, then “the corporate executive would be spending 
someone else’s money for a general social interest.”
15
  Friedman asserted 
that because a corporation is a constructive, rather than natural, person, 
corporate management bears a responsibility to attempt to effectuate the 
business owners’ objectives.  Friedman concluded that while corporate 
owners may have individual social goals, they represent amoral entities, 
and it would be inapposite for corporations to expend corporate money on 
owners’ individual aims.
16
 
Part of the contrepreneurs’ marketing campaign in enacting SEL is 
based on a misunderstanding of Friedman’s philosophy.  They believe that 
boards of directors, as agents to corporate owners, possess a single 
overriding fiduciary duty to maximize profit or shareholder value at the 
expense of all other potential stakeholder interests.
17
  But as Lynn Stout 
recently emphasized, “[c]hasing shareholder value is a managerial choice, 
not a legal requirement,” and “[i]t’s time to free ourselves from the myth of 
shareholder value.”
18
 
Despite growing scholarly critique of SEL in the U.S.,
19
 SEL 
advocates won a meaningful victory in California in 2012, when the state 
enacted legislation providing for the creation of FPCs and benefit 
corporations.
20
  California serves as an example throughout this Article 
 
 14.  Friedman, supra note 11, at 33. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
17.   See e.g., Micelle Cote, Furthering Social Enterprise,  BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM, 
http://blog.us.boehringer-ingelheim.com/home/detail/9059 (“Under current corporate law, 
corporate directors can only consider business practices that will maximize shareholder 
wealth.  Benefit corporations are structured so that they not only allow social entrepreneurs 
to mix profits and purpose, they require it.”). 
 18.  LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 4, 11 (2012). 
 19.  See, e.g., Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 59, 102–03 (2010) (opining that for-profit corporations can often add more social 
value than nonprofits); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New 
Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 881 (2010) 
(characterizing one form of SEL as “unnecessary and unwise”); Felicia R. Resor, Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 98–100 (2012) (claiming that constituency 
statutes, which give directors the freedom to consider interests besides those of the 
shareholder in decision-making, add minimal value). 
 20.  CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517 (West 2012) (governing the creation and 
management of the flexible purpose corporation); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14604 (West 
2012) (governing the creation and management of the benefit corporation). 
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because of its large global economy.
21
  In 2013, legislatures have 
considered SEL in Nevada and corporate-friendly Delaware, where most 
public Fortune 500 companies are incorporated.
22
  SEL is a still-developing 
concept, and courts have only begun to address harms caused by entities 
created under SEL.  This Article seeks to employ historical entity 
comparisons and anecdotal case studies to demonstrate the improvidence of 
SEL-created business organizations.  Because California is the most recent 
state to enact two new SEL-related enterprises, and because it has one of 
the largest global economies, much of this Article examines California’s 
recently enacted SEL and compares California’s SEL to other jurisdictions. 
This Article concerns the ethical dilemma of enacting SEL to enable 
purportedly social and stakeholder-focused enterprises to tug on unwitting 
equity investors’ heartstrings in order to loosen their purse strings.  Part I 
briefly introduces the history, purposes, governance, and taxation relative 
to the dominant pre-2008 existing liability-shielded business organizations, 
corporations, and limited liability companies.  Part II describes the new 
enterprises traceable to SEL: (1) L3Cs, (2) FPCs, (3) benefit corporations, 
and (4) B Lab-certified “B Corps.” It will compare these SEL-related 
entities with pre-existing companies and concludes that no socially 
beneficial need exists for these new enterprises.  Part III includes case 
studies that illustrate the harmonious coexistence of social goals and 
shareholder wealth maximization in other countries, despite the existence 
of SEL.  Part IV asks what is socially beneficial and why SEL should 
designate what corporate activity is socially beneficial.  Part V shows why 
new SEL is unnecessary.  The Article concludes that SEL is a troubling 
non-solution to a problem that does not exist, and that SEL benefits the 
social enterprise cottage industry more than society or investors. 
I. TRADITIONAL LIABILITY-SHIELDED ENTITIES’ HISTORIES, 
PURPOSES, GOVERNANCE, TAXATION, SCALABILITY, AND 
PUBLIC DISCLOSURES 
This Part discusses the background of the material pre-2008 major 
 
 21.  See 2011 California Economic Ratings, NUMBERS IN THE NEWS (Ctr. for 
Continuing Study of the Cal. Econ.), Sept. 2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-Sept-2012-CA-Economy-Rankings-2011.pdf (noting 
that California has consistently ranked as one of the ten largest global economies) 
 22.  A.B. 89, 77th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (enacted) (authorizing the formation of 
benefit corporations in Nevada); S.B. 47, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013) 
(enacted) (authorizing creation of benefit corporations in Delaware); see also LEWIS S. 
BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 
1 (2007), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (noting that “[o]f 
the corporations that make up the Fortune 500, more than one-half are incorporated in 
Delaware.”). 
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forms of businesses that limit individual personal liability and separate 
ownership from control.  It will first discuss the economic moral hazard of 
limiting personal liability through corporate forms.  It then reviews the 
development of modern corporate forms:  (1) Corporations, including (a) C 
corporations (“C-corps”) and (b) S corporations (“S-corps”); and (2) 
limited liability companies (“LLCs”), which developed at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
A. The Moral Hazard Created by Liability Shielded Businesses 
When governments enact statutes that create personal liability 
limitations for corporate actors and investors, they manipulate the economy 
and create tension with market-based capitalism and invite morally 
hazardous behavior.
23
  Until the mid-to-late nineteenth century, most 
corporations were formed via an act of a state legislature, as opposed to the 
modern system of filing with the secretary of state’s office.
24
    Legislatures 
typically shielded equity investors and agents involved in such 
corporations, especially those engaging in large-scale public works 
projects.
25
  But today, anyone can obtain personal liability shields for their 
activities within the business enterprise, via LLCs, limited liability 
partnerships (“LLPs”), S-corps, and C-corps.  These liability shields protect 
individuals acting within these corporate structures should they engage in 
socially irresponsible corporate behavior. 
 
 23.  See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort 
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (2004) (stating that 
“[l]imited shareholder liability produces benefits, but it also inflicts costs, including 
encouraging excessively risky corporate activity.”); Rebecca Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing 
for all Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 107 (2001) (stating that “[s]ome commentators have proposed 
reducing or even eliminating limited liability coverage.  Supporting these proposals is the 
theory that limited liability creates a moral hazard because interest holders are able to 
receive all the benefits of risky activities without all the costs”); Nina A. Mendelson, A 
Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1203, 1203 (2002) (stating that “[s]ome commentators defend limited shareholder liability 
for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to 
overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity.”). 
24.   See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in 
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 84 (1999) (noting 
that “[t]hrough the mid-nineteenth century, American state legislatures created virtually all 
corporations by special charter or franchise.”). 
 25.  Brauneis, supra note 24, at 84; see also Elizabeth Arens, The Elevated Railroad 
Cases: Private Property and Mass Transit in Gilded Age New York, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. 
Am. L. 629, 642-45 (2006) (discussing New York’s immunization of corporations 
conducting public works projects). 
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B. Corporations 
1. General History of Corporations 
Conceptually, corporations have existed since ancient Rome or the 
sixth-century monasteries.
26
  More modern corporations have existed since 
the days of the joint stock companies of the British East India Company in 
the 1400s
27
 and the Dutch East India Company in the early 1600s.
28
  To 
form these national joint stock corporations, a nation’s government
29
 had to 
pass a distinct law to charter each new corporate enterprise.
30
  Some 
scholars believe that this requirement resulted in little interest in obtaining 
corporate charters for local, rather than national, business activities until 
the late eighteenth century.
31
 
The earliest joint stock corporations formed to execute a “public 
purpose,”
32
 i.e., a purpose perceived as beneficial to a nation’s broader 
society.
33
  SEL also purports to serve socially beneficial corporate 
purposes. For example, the corporate and socially beneficial purposes of 
each East India company were to extract natural and human resources from 
“undeveloped” regions.
34
  These companies then employed the stolen 
 
 26.  See JOHN DAVIS, CORPORATIONS VOLUME II: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF 
CORPORATIONS 222–23 (Abram Chayes ed., Capricorn Books 1961) (1904); see also Greg 
MacLeod, The Mondragon Experiment, HARV. INT’L REV. (Apr. 4, 2009, 10:28 PM), 
http://hir.harvard.edu/the-mondragon-experiment (“The concept of the corporation reaches 
back to Roman times.”). 
 27.  THE REGISTER OF LETTERS & C. OF THE GOVERNOUR AND COMPANY OF MERCHANTS 
OF LONDON TRADING INTO THE EAST INDIES, 1600–1619 3 (Sir George Birdwood ed., 
Piccadilly London 1893). 
 28.  See, e.g., CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE 
MADNESS OF CROWDS (L.C. Paige & Co., 11th ed. 1960) (1841) (describing also the Dutch 
East India Company’s role in Holland’s famed tulip bulb bubble). 
 29.  According to the blog maintained by the proxy advisory firm Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), British monarchs had the sole power to charter a corporation 
until the South Sea Bubble Act of 1720 transferred the chartering power to parliament.  
Peter Kinder, Corporations’ Public Purpose: The Myth and the History, INSTITUIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICE GOVERNANCE BLOG (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:50 PM), 
http://blog.issgovernance.com/esg/2007/09/corporations-public-purpose-the-myth-the-
history.html.   
 30.  See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 105, 113 (1888). 
 31.  Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the 
Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 305, 309 (2005). 
 32.  See Kinder, supra note 29 (discussing the myth and history of corporations’ public 
purpose). 
 33.  See, e.g., Cray & Drutman, supra note 31, at 309 (asserting that the Boston Tea 
Party served as a colonial rebellion “against a British corporation and British crown whose 
interests were intertwined”). 
 34.  Id. 
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human and natural resources to further the companies’ respective economic 
expansion and imperialism.
35
  As a result, these companies fulfilled the 
chartered joint stock corporation’s “socially beneficial” public purpose, and 
protected equity holders from personal liability.
36
 
By the United States’ founding, several state legislatures individually 
chartered corporations.  This practice led to questionable practices 
regarding who received a corporate charter, for what purpose, and what 
subsidies (typically protection against competition) were attached to that 
corporation.
37
  In exchange for erecting a barrier to entry for competitors, 
legislators often limited the purposes of charters to causes that expanded 
economic development, such as constructing roads, bridges, or operating 
banks.
38
  Beginning in the 1890s, however, New Jersey broke the 
stranglehold on legislative chartering and set forth a series of laws to 
simplify the incorporation process.
39
 Delaware soon followed suit and 
ultimately achieved dominance over New Jersey during Woodrow 
Wilson’s time as New Jersey’s Governor.
40
 
By the twentieth century, the U.S. had entered an era of general 
incorporation
41
 in which human persons
42
 could form corporate persons by 
submitting a filing to a state government office.  Since the early twentieth 
century, the law has prevented equity investors from attempting to control 
or extract economic value from corporate purpose.
43
  A board of directors, 
elected by the corporation’s shareholders, manages corporations on behalf 
 
 35.  See id.; See also J. Thomas Linblad, Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in 
Indonesia, 1870-1914, 23 MODERN ASIAN STUD. 1 (1989) (arguing that the Dutch imperial 
rule of the Outer Islands helped with the colony’s economic expansion). 
 36.  Cray & Drutman, supra note 31, at 316 (discussing how states fostered increased 
corporate irresponsibility through the adoption of limited liability for investors). 
 37.  See, e.g., Kinder, supra note 29 (explaining the corruption and political favoritism 
were inherent in chartering).   
 38.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, 12, 59 , 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1991). 
 39.  See, e.g., RALPH NADER, ET. AL, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 42–52 (1976). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Cray & Drutman, supra note 31, at 316–17 (explaining that “the system of general 
incorporation gradually replaced individual chartering”). 
42. By this time, the Supreme Court had already ruled that corporations constituted persons 
entitled to legal rights.   See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) 
(“The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are 
all of opinion that it does.”).  The Court recently reexamined this controversial issue in its 
Citizens United decision.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (rejecting the 
argument that corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment "simply because such associations are not 'natural persons.'"). 
 43.  See Groshoff, Junkholder Primacy, supra note 6, at 63 n.13 (mentioning separation 
of ownership and control, as generally discussed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in the 
1930s). 
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of the shareholders.
44
  The board of directors typically retains additional 
managers to run the company’s day-to-day operations.
45
  While no 
requirement exists for shareholders to serve as directors or officers, they 
may serve in both capacities.
46
  A company’s charter and bylaws governs 
the board of directors.
47
 
2. S-corps and C-corps Following the Creation of the Income Tax 
a. C-corps 
i. History 
While corporate taxation has existed since 1913,
48
 the law governing it 
is complex.
49
  Organizing a Subchapter C corporation is not materially 
different than organizing any limited liability entity.
50
  Corporations taxed 
under Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code are colloquially known 
as “C-corps.”
51
 
ii. Governance 
A detailed discussion of C-corps’ governance issues reaches beyond 
the scope of this Article, but equity holders generally possess little control 
or governance rights in a C-corp.
52
  C-corps are appealing for entities 
seeking venture capital investment, because they may offer varied classes 
of shares and may undergo public offerings without significant 
reorganization.
53
 
 
 44.  Michael F. Schaff & Robert J. Chalfin, Basic Factors to Consider when Advising 
Clients in Choosing an LLC or a Corporation, N.J. LAW. MAG., Apr. 2006, at 46. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 48. 
 48.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166 
(1913) (re-imposing federal income tax after the ratification of the 16th Amendment). 
 49.  Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory 
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 90 (1977) (internal citations omitted). 
 50.  Matthew F. Kadish & Brian J. O’Connor, S vs. C—Tax Considerations in 
Corporate Choice of Entity, 2 BUS. ENTITIES 32, 34 (2000). 
 51.  See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital 
Startups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 144 (2003) (referring to a corporation taxed under Subchapter 
C of the Internal Revenue Code as a “C Corp”). 
 52.  See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever 
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1215 (2006) (explaining that creditors 
"do not have their hands on the levers of power"). 
 53.  See Nellie Akalp, What Corporate Structure is Best for Startups Considering VC 
Funding?,  MASHABLE (Dec. 1, 2013 2:36 PM),  http://mashable.com/2011/08/22/startups-
structure-funding/ (discussing C-Corps and venture capital funding). 
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iii. Taxation 
The IRS subjects C-corps to a two-tiered system of taxation, 
commonly known as “double taxation.”
54
 C-corps must pay on taxable 
income, subject to the corporate tax rate, which generally provides a net 
effective rate of forty percent.
55
  In the event the corporation distributes any 
after-tax income to shareholders via dividends, the shareholders are taxed 
on the dividend received.
56
  The tax rate on dividends currently ranges from 
fifteen percent to twenty percent, depending on a filer’s income and 
status.
57
  This so-called double taxation may deter the formation of C-
corps.
58
 
b. S-Corps 
i. History 
S corporations (“S-corps”) have existed since 1958, following years of 
legislative attempts to address the double taxation issue.
 59
   Instead of a 
two-tiered tax system in which the IRS taxes both corporate earnings and 
the earnings distributed to equity holders in the form of dividends, S-corps 
permit pass-through taxation
60
 so that the equity holder is the only person 
 
 54.  Fleischer, supra note 51, at 144.  Commentators have disagreed on the accuracy of 
the term “double taxation.”  Compare Greg Mankiew, On Dividend Taxes, It’s a Post-
Partisan Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at BU-7 (claiming that double taxation exists) 
with Dean Baker, The Double Taxation of Corporate Profits and Other Fairy Tales, BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2011, 10:17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-double-taxation-
of-corporate-profits-and-other-fairy-tales-2011-12 (arguing that the corporation and 
individual shareholders are “distinct persons,” and thus taxation on a C-corp’s profits and 
dividends does not amount to double taxation). 
 55.  See, e.g., Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG (Nov. 24, 2013), 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-
rates-table.aspx (showing global corporate tax rates from 2006 -2013). 
 56.  Kadish & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 34. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Kadish & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 34. 
 59.  See I.R.C. § 1361 (2006) (laying out current taxation rules for S corporations and 
their shareholders); Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 
1606, 1650-57 (1958) (adopting, for the first time, a statute providing for S corporations 
within the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958); see also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When 
American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics, and the History of Organizational 
Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 2 (2008) (stating that “[a]t very rare moments 
Congress has been inclined to, at least partially, eliminate the double tax burden.  One of 
these occasions was in 1958, when Congress added Subchapter S to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954.”). 
60.   James S. Eustice & Thomas Brantley, Fed. Income Tax'n of Corp. & Shareholders 
¶ 6.06[1] (2013) ("From its enactment in 1958, subchapter S has exempted electing 
corporations from the corporate income tax because the corporate income, whether or not 
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subject to taxation.
 61
 
ii. Governance 
S-corps maintain rigid ownership requirements.
62
  Shareholders have 
voting rights on many matters, and the shareholders often include the S-
corp’s directors and officers.  S-corps may not have more than one hundred 
shareholders, and those shareholders cannot be corporations, non-resident 
aliens, pension funds, charities, partnerships, or certain types of trusts.
63
  
These ownership restrictions can make it difficult to attract large or venture 
fund investors to provide capital.
64
  Beyond these ownership requirements, 
S-corps function in the same manner as C-corps, with a board of directors, 
officers, bylaws, and shareholder meetings.
65
 
iii. Taxation 
The IRS does not tax an S-corp’s income at the corporate level.
66
  So 
long as the S-corp maintains certain conditions, an S-corp’s income passes 
through to shareholders.
67
  On equity holders’ individual tax returns, the 
equity holders owe taxes on their pro-rata share of the corporation’s income 
at their individual income tax rates.
68
 
 
distributed, is taxed to the shareholders under a conduit or pass-through regime based 
largely on the partnership model.  Income, losses, deductions, and credits retain their 
corporate-level character and are allocated to the S corporation's shareholders on a per-
share, per-day basis (by virtue of [26 U.S.C.] §§ 1366 and 1377(a)(1), respectively), and are 
treated by the shareholders as if attributable directly to the source from which they were 
generated.") (footnote omitted). 
 61.  Eustice & Brantley, supra note 61, at ¶ 6.06[1]; Michael Doran, Managers, 
Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2009). 
 62.  See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2006) (requiring no more than 100 shareholders, each of 
whom should be an individual except in some narrowly defined circumstances, and none of 
whom may be a nonresident alien). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The ABC’s of LLCs, 40 PRAC. 
LAW. 65, 79-81 (1994) (explaining the difference between LLCs and S-corps and noting that 
LLCs provide more flexibility for investors, including venture capital organizations, and 
real estate ventures). 
 65.  Schaff & Chalfin, supra note 44, at 48. 
 66.  See Kadish & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 36 (explaining that, although taxes in an 
S-corp “pass through” to shareholders, it may be more economically harmful to 
shareholders where the corporation retains its earnings). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See id. (explaining that individual shareholders in an S-corp may use the 
corporation’s losses on their individual returns to offset income to the extent they have stock 
or debt basis in the corporation and to the extent they have passive income). 
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c. LLCs 
i. History 
Although some might argue that LLCs are not “traditional” 
corporations, a discussion of their development is pertinent to an analysis 
of SEL entities. Because LLCs are created by state statute, questions have 
arisen regarding federal taxation of LLCs.  Wyoming passed the first LLC 
statute in 1977,
69
 prompting discussion of federal income taxation of LLCs 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
70
 
The IRS indicated in a 1988 Private Letter Ruling that LLCs’ equity 
holders could treat LLCs as partnerships rather than corporations for the 
purpose of federal income taxation.
71
  Although the IRS had traditionally 
assessed an entity’s tax status using a six-factor test,
 72  
in late 1996 it 
approved “check-the-box” election for LLC owners to choose pass-through 
or double taxation.
73 
 
ii. Governance 
 LLCs give entrepreneurs an enormous amount of flexibility.  Statutes 
authorizing LLCs often contain default rules that serve as gap-fillers for 
items that the parties neglect to contract for in the LLC’s governing 
documents.
74
  Operating agreements typically govern an LLC’s internal 
affairs in a similar manner to how bylaws govern a corporation.
75
  LLC 
equity holders may manage the LLC, or they may delegate managerial 
authority to a third-party manager.
76
 
Because LLCs are liability-shielded entities, members and managers 
of an LLC are not personally liable for its debts and obligations.
77
  The 
liability of a member is generally limited to the amount of one’s capital 
 
 69.  Dale W. Cottam et al., The 2010 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act: A 
Uniform Recipe with Wyoming “Home Cooking”, 11 WYO. L. REV. 49, 51 (2011). 
 70.  Horwood &  Hechtman, supra note 64, at 66 (noting that, “[a]lthough LLCs existed 
in certain states for more than 10 years, LLCs were not generally considered viable entities 
until 1988 when the Internal Revenue Service [ ] ruled that LLCs may be taxed as 
partnerships rather than as corporations”). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (adopting the six factors 
initially introduced in Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), used to determine 
an entity’s tax classification status). 
 73.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (as amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66, 584 (1996)).  
 74.  Horwood & Hechtman, supra note 64, at 68. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 69. 
 77.  Id. at 71. 
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contribution, plus any agreed-upon but unpaid contribution.
78
 .
79
 
iii. Taxation 
As detailed above, one of the primary attractions of an LLC is its 
hybrid nature that offers pass-through federal taxation along with a 
personal liability shield.  Unless an LLC elects to be taxed as a corporation, 
the IRS will designate the LLC as a partnership for federal income tax 
purposes, allowing pass-through taxation to each member.
80
 
II. L3CS, FPCS, BENEFIT CORPORATIONS, B CORP. 
CERTIFICATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL FOILS 
The television show Boston Legal humorously demonstrated the 
confusion among attorneys at the fictitious law firm Crane, Poole, and 
Schmidt regarding the purpose and benefits of a particular socially focused 
enterprise: 
Denny Crane:  What the hell kind of charity is “Children’s 
Group?” 
Shirley Schmidt:  We’re teaching children to read. 
Denise Bauer:  No, we’re buying them food. 
Alan Shore:  I thought we were providing them with old people 
to play with. 
Paul Lewiston:  I believe it’s a children’s theatre group. 
Denny Crane:  Now how can kids with muscular dystrophy do 
theatre? 
Brad Chase:  They don’t have muscular dystrophy. 
Denny Crane:  Then what in the hell are we doing here?
81
 
No humor exists, however, when attempting to address the meaningful 
concerns embedded in SEL.  Social enterprise participants do, however, 
demonstrate a nearly comedic inability to articulate even the most basic 
cohesive definition of “social enterprise.”  
 Unlike the more traditional corporate entities discussed in Part I, 
socially focused enterprises lack a clear legal structure and definition. 
82
   
 
 78.  Id. 
79 See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity 
Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 557, n.17 (2012) 
(stating that publicly traded LLCs are master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) and “[a]lthough 
publicly traded LLCs are, of course, not limited partnerships, such firms are typically 
discussed in the same context as MLPs.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 80.  Byron F. Egan, Choice of Entity Decision Tree After Margin Tax and Texas 
Business Organizations Code, 42 TEX. J. BUS. L. 71, 157 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 
 81.  Boston Legal: The Cancer Man Can (ABC television broadcast Jan. 10, 2006). 
 82.  See, e.g., Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 
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For example, Ashoka, a meaningful player in the social enterprise 
movement, indicates in its training materials that a “social enterprise” is 
“[a]n organization applying business strategies to achieving philanthropic 
goals” and “[a]n organization that makes money and does good.”
83
 Ashoka 
mateirals also state, however, that “social entrepreneurs” do not necessarily 
engage in the work of, or constitute members in, “social enterprise.”
84
  
Similarly, Professor Thomas Kelley indicates that “[t]he nomenclature of 
this new area is variable and contested.”
85
  And Professors Robert Katz and 
Anthony Page claim that “[s]ocial enterprise is a loose term for businesses 
that aim to generate profits while advancing social goals.”
86
  
Similarly to Kelley, Katz, and Page, Karen Raz agrees that “[t]he 
definitions of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship are 
controversial.  The field lacks consensus, resulting in the plethora of 
existing definitions.”
87
  Given Raz’s highly specialized background as a 
former NYU Law and Social Enterprise Fellow and co-founder of NYU’s 
Law and Social Entrepreneurship Association,
88
 her definition of the the 
term “social enterprise,” is presumably respected within the field. While 
Raz defines social enterprise as “an organization or venture that advances a 
social mission through entrepreneurial, earned-income strategies,”
89
 she 
also states that her definition reflects the definitions advanced by the Social 
Enterprise Alliance (“SEA”) and Social Enterprise UK (“SEUK”).
90
 
The SEA’s and SEUK’s respective definitions, however, are 
inconsistent with Raz’s.  The SEA defines “social enterprises” as 
“businesses whose primary purpose is the common good,” and whose goals 
are accomplished by:  (1) “directly address[ing] an intractable social need 
and serv[ing] the common good”; (2) having its commercial activity serve 
as “a strong revenue driver”; and (3) having the “common good [as] its 
 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 285 n.3 (2012) (stating that “[t]he definitions of social 
enterprise and social entrepreneurship are controversial. The field lacks consensus, resulting 
in the plethora of existing definitions.”). 
 83.  MORRISON FOERESTER, JONES DAY & ADLER & COLVIN, TRAINING FOR ASHOKA 
FELLOWS: HYBRID STRUCTURES: NONPROFITS, FOR-PROFITS, AND NEW CORPORATE FORMS 6-
7 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter TRAINING FOR ASHOKA FELLOWS] (on file with the University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law). 
 84.  See Noga Leviner, Leslie R. Crutchfield & Diana Wells, Understanding the Impact 
of Social Entrepreneurs: Ashoka’s Answer to the Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness, in 
RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTRIBUTING TO AN 
EMERGING FIELD 93 (Rachel Mosher-Williams ed., 2007). 
 85.  Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 337, 340 n.7 (2009). 
 86.  Katz & Page, supra note 6, at 1353. 
 87.  Raz, supra note 82, at 285 n.3. 
88.   Id. at 283. 
 89.  Id. at 285. 
 90.  Id. at 285 n.3. 
250 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
primary purpose, literally ‘baked into’ the organization’s DNA, and 
trumping all other[ ] [purposes].”
91
  Conversely, Social Enterprise UK 
offers many contextual examples of what may constitute “social 
enterprise,” but in terms of a definition, the organization states only that 
“[s]ocial enterprises are businesses trading for social and environmental 
purposes.”
92
  Although the SEA’s definition of a “social enterprise” seems 
fairly loose, it has protected the term from private companies. For example,  
when Salesforce.com attempted to trademark the term “social enterprise,”
93
 
in 2012, the SEA opposed the action, claiming that “‘[s]ocial enterprise’ is 
a phrase that for more than two decades has been commonly used to 
describe business models, both nonprofit and for-profit, whose primary 
purpose is the common good.”
94
 
Despite the demonstrated lexical mess, this Article will not confuse 
the strained meanings of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship 
further by creating yet another definition.  Instead, this Article presumes 
that the reader will conceptualize social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship as the terms currently stand, with various definitions. This 
Article assumes that the challenges in defining social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship make analyzing SEL particularly difficult.  This Part will, 
however, describe the new business formations traceable to SEL:  (1) L3Cs 
(2) FPCs, (3) Benefit Corporations, and (4) B Lab’s (B Lab’s) “Certified B 
Corporations.”  This Part will then compare the entities that one can form 
under SEL with the entities described in Part I.  This Part will conclude that 
vehicles created under SEL and the contrepreneurs’ lobbying for the 
enabling SEL appear to be “crusade[s] without a cause,”
95
 and represent 
 
 91.  Why, SOC. ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/why (last visited Oct. 27, 
2013) (emphasis in original).  Furthermore, while this is a pedantic point, diction matters 
when it serves as a basis for laws, and it is something that even experts in the social 
enterprise field struggle with, as demonstrated by the use of the word “literally.”  See THE 
CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE § 5.202 (Univ. of Chi. Press 13th ed. 2003) (1982) “Commonly 
Misused Words” (stating “‘[l]iterally’ means ‘actually; without exaggeration.’  It should not 
be used oxymoronically in figurative senses, as in they were literally glued in to their seats 
(unless glue had in fact been applied).”) (emphasis in original). 
 92.  SOC. ENTER. U.K. & UNITY TRUST BANK, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EXPLAINED, 3 (2011), 
available at  
http://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/uploads/editor/files/Publications/Social_Enterprise_Expl
ained.pdf. 
 93.  By trademarking, the company may have perhaps created a single definition for the 
term, a move that SEA resisted.  
 94.  Social Enterprise Alliance Opposes Salesforce.com’s Attempt to Trademark the 
Term “Social Enterprise” and Encourages Salesforce.com’s Engagement to Build the Field, 
PRWEB (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/social-enterprise/trademark-
opposition/prweb9845675.htm; but see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
 95.  Jeffrey L. Kwall, Subchapter G of the Internal Revenue Code: A Crusade Without 
a Cause?, 5 VA. TAX REV. 223, 223 (1985). 
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more forms of the “[m]yth” of “[t]he [e]mperor’s [n]ew [c]lothes.”
96
 
A. L3Cs 
 
This subpart (1) reviews the history of L3Cs via the nation’s first L3C 
statute, enacted in Vermont; (2) describes North Carolina’s push for L3C 
legislation and applies longstanding economic theory coupled with a 
practical example to demonstrate North Carolina’s flawed legislative 
purpose in passing its L3C legislation; and (3) describes several high-
profile nonprofits and other organizations that vehemently oppose L3C 
legislation. 
 
Vermont passed the first legislation enabling L3Cs in April 2008.
97
  
To organize as a Vermont L3C, an enterprise must meet certain basic 
requirements.  First, the business must further the accomplishment of one 
or more charitable or educational purposes within § 170(c)(2)(B) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (“I.R.C.”), and the company’s formation 
must not have occurred but for the accomplishment of the charitable or 
educational purpose.
98
  Second, the significant purpose of the business 
cannot be the production of income or appreciation of property.
99
  Third, 
the business’s purpose cannot be to achieve a political or legislative 
purpose within the meaning of I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
100
  L3Cs attempt to 
obtain program-related investments (“PRIs”) from foundations.
101
 
1. Governance 
At its essence, an L3C is an LLC structured to seek below-market 
returns in hopes of obtaining some of its capitalization from private 
foundation funding.  As a result, many laws relating to L3C governance 
resemble the laws affecting LLC governance, including the standards of 
 
 96.  See Kleinberger, supra note 19, at 879 (“debunk[ing] each major tenet of the L3C 
‘movement’ and reveal[ing] the legal and practical realities under ‘The Emperor’s New 
Clothes.’”). 
 97.  Doug Batey, LLC LAW MONITOR (Aug. 21, 2009), 
http://www.llclawmonitor.com/2009/08/articles/lowprofit-llcs/lowprofit-llcs-the-newest-
limited-liability-company-structure/); see also An Act Relating to Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies, H.775, 2007-08 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2008), available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008/acts/ACT106.HTM. 
 98.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2012). 
 99.  Id. at § 3001(27)(B). 
 100.  Id. at § 3001(27)(C). 
 101.  TRAINING FOR ASHOKA FELLOWS, supra note 83, at 26. 
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conduct for both members and managers.
102
 
In a member-managed LLC, the member owes to the company and 
other equity holders fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
103
  Those default 
duties include:  the duty to account to the company and hold as trustee any 
property, profit, or benefit; the duty to abstain from having an adverse 
interest to the company during the company’s operation or winding up; and 
the duty to abstain from competing with the company before the dissolution 
of the company.
104
  Finally, during the winding up of the company’s affairs, 
a member must act as a reasonable person would in similar circumstances 
while taking into account the best interests of the company.
105
 
In a manager-managed LLC, these fiduciary duties apply to the 
managers but not to the members.
106
  Additionally, a member of the LLC 
does not owe a fiduciary duty to the company or other members by virtue 
of being a member of the LLC.
107
 
Just as LLCs attempt to provide maximum freedom of contract in 
creating the enterprise, founders of L3Cs may also alter almost any 
governance matters by negotiation, provided that those matters are 
discussed in the company’s operating agreement.
108
 
2. Purpose 
As discussed above, only entitities with certain educational or 
charitable purposes may organize as L3Cs in Vermont.The charitable or 
education purpose requirement of an L3C is essential to helping the 
company attract investments from private foundations and nonprofits, 
known as PRIs.
109
  PRIs must comply with the requirements of I.R.C. § 
170(c)(2)(B).
110
 
Should the company organize as an L3C and later fail to satisfy any of 
the above requirements, the L3C will lose its L3C status and transition to 
 
 102.  Id.  For an outline of the general standards governing members’ and managers’ 
conduct, see REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006). 
 103.  REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a) (2006). 
 104.  Id. at § 409(b)(1)-(3). 
 105.  Id. at § 409(c). 
 106.  Id. at § 409(g)(1). 
 107.  Id. at § 409(g)(5). 
 108.  Id. at §§ 110, 111. 
 109.  See Dana Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 619, 622 (2010) [hereinafter Reiser, Governing and Financing] (stating that “[t]he 
[L3C] model was intended to fit easily onto various states’ LLC bases and provide sufficient 
limitations so that properly formed L3Cs would qualify to receive ‘program related 
investments’ (PRIs) under existing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules.”). 
 110.  I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006) (defining program-related investments and providing that 
such contributions do not jeopardize a tax-exempt organization’s charitable status). 
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an LLC.
111
  All other relevant law governing an L3C comes from the state’s 
law applying to LLCs.
112
 But, as described earlier, the federal taxation of 
L3Cs and LLCs remains quite different.  That an L3C may lose its L3C 
status suggests that organizations could work for traditional L3C 
educational and charitable purposes under a different and existing structure, 
the LLC.  Therefore, each of these purposes could have been achieved via 
an LLC, without the existence of the L3C as a form of SEL. 
3. Taxation 
This subpart addresses the requirement of the L3C maintaining a 
charitable purpose under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).  One challenge raised by 
L3Cs—at least under Vermont’s L3C legislation—is of regulation and 
enforcement, especially surrounding the company’s social mission.  While 
the IRS could act as a shadow regulator, the IRS has questionable ability to 
oversee L3Cs.
113
  Although L3Cs ostensibly pursue a charitable or 
educational mission in addition to profit, if the profits should ever exceed 
the charitable or educational purpose, then the L3C transforms into an 
LLC. 
The drafters of L3C legislation wanted to structure L3Cs to comply 
with the Internal Revenue Code in order to attract investment from private 
foundations.
114
   A state, however, cannot create any entity exempt from 
federal taxation.  To contextualize in the L3C case, despite initial enabling 
legislation in the late 1970s in some states, LLCs did not surge in 
popularity and become legitimate business forms in all fifty states until 
after the IRS opined on the taxation of the LLC.
115
  And relating to 
taxation, members of the L3C are taxed as if the business organizations 
 
 111.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D) (2012). 
 112.  See Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 109, at 623 (stating that “[t]he 
L3C legislation includes virtually no additional content beyond the four core requirements, 
relying instead on existing LLC law to address any matters not covered by these spare 
enactments.  LLC law is quite voluminous, covering myriad topics ranging from filing 
requirements to investor liability to derivative actions.”) (internal citations omitted). 
113.   Marya N. Cotten & Gail A. Lasprogata, Corporate Citizenship & Creative 
Collaberation: Best Practices for Cross-Sector Partnerships, 18 J.L. BUS. & ETH. 9, 37 
(2012) ("[C]urrently an L3C is not automatically determined to be a PRI without an 
individual determination by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service ('IRS').  This will remain the 
case without either a blanket ruling by the IRS with such a qualification, the creation of an 
IRS approval process and roster of approved entities or an act of the U.S. Congress (which 
has not occurred as of the writing of this article.") (footnotes omitted). 
114.   Program-Related Investing in L3Cs: A Question-and-Answer Guide, 118 JTAX 41, 
43 (2013) ("As an otherwise standard LLC for federal tax purposes, the L3C is by default 
either disregarded altogether (if it has a sole member) or is treated as a partnership (if there 
are two or more members)."). 
 115.  See supra Part I.B.2.c. 
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were an LLC.
116
  For federal tax purposes, LLCs have been treated as 
partnerships under federal income tax law since 1997.
117
  Because LLCs 
allow for “pass-through” taxation, businesses themselves are not subject to 
federal taxation on their income; rather, the profits and losses are assigned 
to each member for taxation at that member’s tax status.
118
 
 
4. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information 
No obligation exists for L3Cs to provide additional non-financial 
disclosures to investors that relate to the low-profit mission of the 
enterprise.
119
 
5. L3Cs and Protectionism 
Vermont’s enacted the first L3C legislation in 2008, and North 
Carolina followed suit in 2010.
120
  Examining the L3C movement in North 
Carolina provides context for analyzing some SEL.  Bob Lang, who drafted 
Vermont’s model L3C legislation, also lobbied North Carolina’s politicians 
in hopes of enacting L3C legislation in the name of “rescu[ing] [the state’s] 
flailing furniture industry” from offshoring domestic jobs to China.
 121
 
While enacting laws in the name of protectionism may enable 
politicians to score re-election votes in their respective districts,
122
 
government’s protectionist interference can materially harm both the 
domestic and global economies’ long-run production possibilities 
frontiers.
123
  Although both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
 
 116.  See Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 109, at 623 (stating that “the L3C 
relies heavily on the tax treatment of LLCs to produce its desired effects.”). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 623-24 (describing the taxation procedure for LLCs and L3Cs). 
119 .   VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2012). 
 120.  See David L. Kyger & Dianne Chipps Bailey, The L3C: North Carolina’s Newest 
Type of Entity, N.C. BAR ASSOC. (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://businesslaw.ncbar.org/newsletters/nbinov2010/lc3innc; see also N.C. GEN. STAT § 
57C-2-01(d) (2010) (codifying legislation providing for the new form of business entity). 
 121.  An Overview of Low-profit Limited Liability Companies, ISSUE BRIEF 2011-210 
(The Fla. Senate Comm. on Commerce), 2010, at 8, available at  
http://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/InterimReports/2011/2011-210cm.pdf. 
 122.  Daniel J. Gifford, The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global Trade and Tensions, 15 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 297, 298-99 (2006) (stating that “[b]ecause business firms in adversely-
affected industries are more likely to be organized than consumers, they are more likely to 
be able to exert political pressures on government decision makers.”); Gerald Willmann, 
Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of  Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs 
(2005), available at http://willmann.com/~gerald/pe-trade.pdf. (discussing the election of 
protectionist legislators).   
 123.  See, e.g., John Cirace, When Judges Balance Interests Through Trade-offs, They 
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employed protectionism to advance a government-sponsored bailout of two 
U.S. automakers in 2008-09,
124
 by 2012, President Obama ostensibly had 
distanced himself from protectionist policies.
125
 
Further, the orthodox Ricardian, Neo-Ricardian, and Sraffian 
economic theories demonstrate how protectionism is generally socio-
economically harmful.
126
  These theories posit that when a given economy 
focuses resources where it has a comparative productivity advantage over 
another economy or economies, long-term socially beneficial economic 
activity results.
127
  Empirical studies support the theory that comparative 
advantage economies tend to perform better than those adopting 
 
Implicitly Use Economic Theory to Order Cases, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 27 app. at 55-
57 (detailing the trade-offs faced by an economy through the elaboration of the production 
possibility frontier); Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A 
Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 268 n.169 and 
accompanying text (1993) (describing production possibilities frontiers and Pareto-efficient 
solutions). 
 124.  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 101(a) 
(2008); see also David Groshoff, The New Meaning of Public Company: Challenges to the 
Government’s Post-Bailout Exit as a Corporate Stakeholder, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 179, 
179 (2009) [hereinafter Groshoff, New Meaning of Public Company] (arguing that material 
government interventions benefitted the flow of capital to one company, instead of other 
companies and industries in greater need of that capital, such as the automotive industry that 
ultimately received a government bailout).  For full disclosure regarding this Author’s 
relationship with JPMorgan, see Groshoff, Junkholder Primacy, supra note 6, at 94 n.182. 
 125.  Specifically, during a presidential debate, President Obama told former 
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, 
You mentioned [not wanting to make cuts to] the Navy  .  .  . and that we have 
fewer ships than we did in 1916.  Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses 
and bayonets, because the nature of our military’s changed  .  .  .  . We have 
these things called aircraft carriers, where planes land on them.  We have these 
ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines. 
Third Presidential Debate: Full Transcript, ABC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012) 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/presidential-debate-full-
transcript/story?id=17538888&singlePage=true; see also Debate Quote: Obama on the 
Changing Nature of the Military – “We have Fewer Horses and Bayonets” than we did in 
1916, FOX NEWS INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2012, 10:21 PM), 
http://foxnewsinsider.com/2012/10/22/debate-quote-obama-on-the-changing-nature-of-the-
military-we-have-fewer-horses-and-bayonets-than-we-did-in-1916/. 
 126.  See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law of 
Gatt: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading System, 18 CAL. W. 
INT'L L.J. 291, 316 & n.131 (1988) (describing Ricardo's doctrine of comparative 
advantage); DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND TAXATION 
(Dover Publications 2004) (1817) (describing the Ricardian and Neo-Ricardian economic 
theories); PIERO SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODITIES BY MEANS OF COMMODITIES: 
PRELUDE TO A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC THEORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1975) (describing 
the Sraffian economic theory). 
 127.  D. Russell Roberts, When does a decrease in distortion increase welfare?, 39 
ECONOMICS LETTERS 37, 37–42 (1992). 
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protectionist measures;
128
 that open, multilateral trade stimulates global 
economic development; and that “trade barriers . . . and other trade-
distorting measures” are of particular concern to developing countries.
129
 
Protectionism—the underpinning of some SEL—thus helps prolong 
an economy’s comparative disadvantage by constricting the expansion of 
domestic and international production possibilities frontiers.
130
   
6. Opposition from Generally Well-Regarded Groups 
Advocates of L3C statutes have faced high-profile opposition.  For 
example, in May 2012, the New York Council of non-profits wrote to the 
New York legislature, arguing that “L3C’s are an alternative path to 
charities or profiteers who seek to avoid public scrutiny and appropriate 
regulatory, oversight including executive compensation.”
131
  Other non-
profits also have opposed the L3C structure.  The managing attorney of The 
Law Firm for Nonprofits, PC, recently wrote that “it is unclear what 
function an L3C serves other than that ‘it creates the illusion of value.’”
132
 
The ABA’s Business Law Section reflects a similar skepticism 
towards L3Cs.
133
  It states that the tranched financing
134
 related to PRIs 
 
 128.  See, e.g., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, WORLD BANK, (1987) (reviewing the 
periods 1963-73 and 1973-85 of developing economies such as Ghana); Nancy Birdsall et. 
al, How to Help Poor Countries, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 136, 147 (2005) (“Wealthy nations can 
also take positive steps to directly benefit developing countries—specifically, by  .  .  . 
enhancing global labor mobility.”). 
 129.  U.N. Gen. Assembly, Preparatory Comm. for the Int’l Conference on Fin. for Dev., 
Fourth Session, Agenda item 3, Finalization of the Outcome of the Int’l Conference on Fin. 
for Dev., Paragraphs 26, 28, at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.257/L13 (Jan. 30, 2002). 
130 A production possibility frontier is "the set of Pareto optimal points at which there can be 
no more of A without having less of B."  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 499 (2013). 
 131.  Memorandum of Opposition from Doug Sauer, CEO of N.Y. Council of 
Nonprofits, Inc. (NYCON) to Members of the N.Y. State Legislature (May 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.nycon.org/news/newsDetails.asp?newsid=401.  Cf. infra Part II.D 
(detailing B Lab’s social contrepreneurship activities). 
 132.  Arthur Rieman et al., California’s New Hybrid Corporation Statute, L.A. LAWYER 
19 (Sept. 2012) (quoting Matthew Doeringer, Reevaluating the L3C: Mistaken Assumptions 
and Potential Solutions, in PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT MGMT. 15 
(Duke Univ., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696267). 
 133.  See Letter and Attachments from Linda Rusch, Chair ABA Bus. Law Section, to 
Steve Simon, H. Minority Leader, Minn. H. of Rep. (Apr. 19, 2012), available at 
http://open.wmitchell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=facsch  (stating the 
ABA Business Law Section’s views on a bill relating to limited liability companies and low-
profit limited liability companies).  The date of this letter is the same date that a proposed 
tax regulation relative to L3C’s appeared in the Federal Register.  Examples of Program 
Related Investments, 77 Fed. Reg. 2012-9468 (Apr. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-04-19/html/2012-9468.htm. 
 134.  L3C’s tranched financing is highly quantitative, and is beyond this Article’s scope.  
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under the I.R.C. yet “promoted by L3C advocates portend[] serious risk” of 
benefitting for-profit investors’ private interests, which can “imperil a 
[charitable] foundation’s tax-exempt status.”
135
  The ABA’s Business Law 
Section concludes that, relative to PRIs and charitable foundations, “[t]he 
L3C is no better than any other business form  .  .  . [and] L3C legislation 
implies otherwise and we believe is therefore misleading.”
136
 
B. FPCs 
1. History 
California became the first state to enact FPC legislation.
137
  So far, it 
is the only state to do so.
138
   
2. Governance 
FPC directors may consider the best interests of the corporation, its 
equity holders, and any special purpose interest set forth in the corporate 
charter.
139
  This language does not materially differ from the language used 
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
140
 where a Michigan court indicated that 
directors of a corporation must primarily focus on shareholder interests; nor 
does the language materially differ from California’s statutory regime for 
traditional corporations, which similarly states that management must focus 
primarily on shareholder interests.
141
  Constituency statutes enacted in a 
majority of states permit—but do not mandate—directors to consider non-
shareholder interests.
142
 
 
It is the subject of a work-in-progress. 
 135.  Daniel S. Kleinberger, ABA Business Law Section, on Behalf of Its Committees on 
LLCs And Nonprofit Organizations, Opposes Legislation for Low Profit Limited Liability 
Companies (L3Cs), (Wm. Mitchell Coll. of Law Faculty Scholarship, paper 228, 2012), 
available at http://open.wmitchell.edu/facsch/228. 
 136.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 137.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(a) (West 2012); Rieman et al., supra note 132, at 19. 
138.    Rieman et al., supra note 132, at 19. 
 139.  CAL CORP. CODE § 2700(a) (West 2012). 
140.   170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); See Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics 
with Shareholder Value: The Case for Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political 
Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2012) (“Over ninety years 
after Dodge, [its]  rationale still resonates in American corporate law today.  Although 
modern corporate law rules are extremely deferential to the discretion of corporate 
management, most courts still require that board decisions be made with the best interests of 
shareholders in mind.”).  
 141.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2012). 
 142.  Discussing the various nuances of constituency statutes are beyond this Article’s 
scope.  For a brief explanation of constituency statutes, see Anthony Bisconti, Note and 
Comment, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially 
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Assuming, however, that the FPC language does permit management 
to focus on other stakeholder interests, then the language used in 
California’s statute further reduces fiduciary obligations owed to business 
owners.  I posit that this reduction in obligation will drive capital to the 
higher-yielding corners of the corporate debt markets, where investors can 
contract for the rights and governance restrictions they want, or that 
investors will move their corporate-invested capital to international equities 
subject to stronger fiduciary-like duties than those that exist in the U.S.
143
 
3. Purpose 
In California, an FPC’s charter must identify a public benefit 
purpose.
144
  That purpose may include charitable or public purpose 
activities, or it may consist of promoting or minimizing bad effects of the 
FPC’s operations on the employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, 
community, society, or environment.
145
  Most directors of entities owe their 
stakeholders, at a bare minimum, a duty of loyalty; FPC directors , 
however, owe no such duties.
146
  Controlling and extracting equity can be 
quite challenging for FPC investors.  
Confusion exists as to which business organizations in California 
indeed are FPCs.  A quick comparison of FPCs listed on the California 
Secretary of State’s website,
147
 for example, demonstrates how differently 
organizations construe the public benefit requirement. Ontario, California’s 
“Charity Thrift FPC” incorporated as an FPC on October 26, 2012,
148
 
“Generosity Holdings” incorporated as an FPC on November 29, 2012,
149
 
“Giga Solar” incorporated as an FPC on April 6, 2012,
150
 “Real Asset 
Investment Services, FPC” on October 29, 2012,
151
 and perhaps the most 
 
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon-Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 780 (2009) 
(“Constituency statutes essentially permit directors to consider, to varying degrees, 
nonshareholder interests when making corporate decisions.  At least on their face, 
constituency statutes provide a legislative alternative to the developing case law originating 
in the ever-influential Delaware courts.”). 
 143.  See, e.g., Groshoff, Junkholder Primacy, supra note 6, passim (discussing the 
competing theories of corporate governance and fiduciary duties). 
 144.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2) (West 2012). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at §§ 2603(10) (permitting a flexible purpose corporation’s articles of 
incorporation to contain provisions limiting or eliminating personal liability of a director in 
a breach of fiduciary duty action). 
 147.  Business Search, CAL. SECRETARY OF ST. DEBRA BOWEN, 
http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/cbs.aspx (select “Entity Number”; type in the specific Entity 
Number; then select “Search”) (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 148.  Id. (Entity Number “C3517785”). 
 149.  Id. (Entity Number “C3520963”). 
 150.  Id. (Entity Number “C3469924”). 
 151.  Id. (Entity Number “C3517755”). 
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confusing of all, is “Vicarious FPC, Inc.,” incorporated on July 31, 2012.
152
  
That these entities “incorporated” as FPCs begs the question of what, 
exactly, they are, and if corporation or FPC law governs them.  
4. Taxation 
Unlike L3Cs, FPCs cannot make a tax-treatment election, whether as a 
partnership, C-corp, S-corp, or otherwise.
153
 
 
5. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information 
 
FPCs must disclose non-financial information in an annual report or 
“special purpose current report.” This report includes a specific 
Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section addressing the 
objectives of and changes to the special purpose
154
 and what the FPC did 
during the reporting period to materially achieve the special purpose.
155
  
California’s FPC statute requires several additional disclosures.
156
  Any 
assessments of the FPC’s governance that might be disclosed in an annual 
report or “special purpose current report” may be conducted in-house and 
not by a third-party.
157
 
C. Benefit Corporations 
1. History 
Using California as the example of how benefit corporations 
originated, Assembly Bill 361, which created benefit corporations, met 
vehement opposition from the Corporations Committee of the Business 
Law Section of the State Bar of California.
158
  In a letter to Jared Huffman, 
 
 152.  Id. (Entity Number “C3492551”). 
 153.  Steven R. Chiodoni & David A. Levitt, Program-Related Investing in L3Cs: A 
Question-And-Answer Guide, 1 J. TAX’N 42 (2013). 
 154.  CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3500, 3501 (West 2012). 
 155.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 3501 (West 2012). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  CAL. CORP CODE §§ 3500, 3501 (West 2012) (requiring disclosure of certain 
governance aspects but neglecting to mention a requirement of preparation by an 
independent third party). 
 158.  In the interest of full disclosure, while I attended some meetings of this Section as 
an Associate Member of the California State Bar Business Law Section, I possessed no 
voting rights, as my bar memberships are in New York, Ohio, and Massachusetts. In 
California I am a tentative Registered In-House Counsel. 
260 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
member of the California State Assembly in 2011, the Committee 
expressed its disapproval of the bill.  The bill was flawed, the Committee 
wrote, because “AB 361 marginalize[d] shareholders, relie[d] on a third-
party standard largely beneficial to one organization [B Lab], [wa]s not 
well integrated into the existing Code, and fail[ed] to make benefit 
corporations easily recognizable to the public.”
159
  Furthermore, as the 
California Bar indicated, it was “unclear if directors of benefit 
corporations have duties to shareholders.”
160
 
Worse, the letter indicated that “[i]f directors only have a duty to the 
corporation and not to the shareholders and shareholders are just a factor 
that can be moved to the bottom of the list of priorities, it is unclear what 
effect this would have on shareholder rights to bring claims against 
directors.”
161
  California’s benefit corporation SEL created statutory 
confusions in the Corporations Code ranging from defining unused terms to 
failing to define utilized terms (such as “equity”)
162
 to referring to corporate 
entities that exist nowhere else in the California Corporations Code.
163
 
Certain definitions, however, merit sufficient importance to reproduce in 
this Article, particularly the definitions of a “general public benefit”
164
 and 
a “specific public benefit.”
165
 
A “‘[g]eneral public benefit’ means a material positive impact on 
society and the environment, taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-
party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation.”
166
  B Lab or its wholly owned subsidiary GIIRS, discussed 
infra, is the market leader in providing (and inventor of) the third-party 
standard.
167
  This situation is unsurprising, given that B Lab, along with its 
acolytes, has pushed for SEL that drives revenues to B Lab for 
certifications.
 168
 The California statute, however, requires that a standard 
be developed by an entity with “no material financial relationship with the 
benefit corporation or any of its subsidiaries.”
169
 Here the standard that 
certifiers must meet is the mere absence of a “material” relationship with 
 
 159.  Letter from Corp. Comm. of the Bus. Law Section of the State Bar of Cal. to the 
Hon. Jared Huffman, Member of the Assembly of the State of Cal. 2 (Apr. 26, 2011) 
(emphasis added) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law). 
 160.  Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added). 
 161.  Id. at Ex. A p. 8. 
 162.  Id. at Ex. B, at 7 -8. 
 163.  Id. at 1. 
 164.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2012). 
 165.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e) (West 2012). 
 166.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
 167.  See infra Part II.D. 
 168.  See GIIRS Terms and Conditions, GIIRS, 
http://www.giirs.org/component/content/article/117 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
169.   CAL. CORP.  CODE § 14601(g) (West 2012). 
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the benefit corporation.
170
 
California’s benefit corporation legislation defines a “specific public 
benefit”
 
as: 
Providing low-income or underserved individuals or 
communities with beneficial products or services. 
Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities 
beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of business. 
Preserving the environment. 
Improving human health. 
Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge. 
Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit 
purpose. 
The accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or 
the environment.
171
 
These definitions of “specific public benefit” are extremely vague, and 
challengers may seek to clarify them through otherwise needless litigation. 
2. Governance 
Professor Daniel Kleinberger argues that “if the board at [a benefit 
corporation] falls down on its job, it might be able to point to ill-defined 
‘social benefits’ to escape liability for its actions.”
172
  Kleinberger notes 
that “‘[o]ne of the best ways to rip people off is to tell them that you’re 
working for the good of God or the good of the environment or the good of 
whatever . . . .’”
173
 
Benefit corporation owners may bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding against the benefit corporation.
174
  The directors of benefit 
corporations must consider the probable effects of an enforcement 
proceeding on third-party stakeholders, but those stakeholders do not have 
legal standing to instate such proceedings themselves.  A benefit 
enforcement proceeding may either be brought directly by the benefit 
corporation itself, or derivatively by a shareholder.
175
  Such proceedings 
may also be maintained by a director, a person or group of persons who 
own more than five percent of the equity interests in an entity of which the 
 
 170.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(2) (West 2012). 
 171.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e) (West 2012). 
 172.  Matt Sledge, Benefit Corporations Aim to Help Capitalism Save Itself, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 6:28 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/benefit-corporations-patagonia-greyston-
bakery_n_1632318.html.  For full disclosure, I currently serve as a regular columnist for 
The Huffington Post. 
 173.  Id. (quoting Professor Kleinberger). 
174.   CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623 (West 2012). 
175.   CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b) (West 2012). 
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benefit corporation is a subsidiary, or other persons specified in the benefit 
corporation’s charter or bylaws.
176
 
  Even if an enforcement proceeding occurs against a benefit 
corporation, the benefit corporation likely will not receive more than a 
proverbial slap on the wrist.
177
  If non-shareholder stakeholders are harmed 
to the benefit of shareholders, then shareholders likely would forego any 
enforcement of the public benefit and instead seek increased returns by 
having the company emphasize profits over any social benefit.
178
 
The fiduciary duties imposed on a benefit corporation’s board of 
directors differ from the duties imposed by the shareholder primacy 
doctrine. In the event of the auction sale of a business following a hostile 
takeover attempt, however, “[t]he duty of the board [will] thus change[] 
from the preservation of  .  .  . [the] corporate entity to the maximization of 
the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”
179
  The duties 
language advanced by contrepreneurs opposes Revlon, insisting that 
consideration of non-shareholder interests 
shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a breach of a 
Director’s fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of a Change 
in Control Transaction where, as a result of weighing other 
Stakeholders’ interests, a Director determines to accept an offer, 
between two competing offers, with a lower price per share.
180
 
3. Purpose 
California Corporations Code § 14602 requires that a benefit 
corporation’s charter state that “the corporation is a benefit corporation” 
and that it “identify any specific public benefit adopted pursuant to Section 
14610.”
181
  However, the charter also must include a purpose statement per 
§ 202(b), which requires a purpose consistent with the California Corporate 
 
 176.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b)(West 2012). 
 177.  See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(c) (West 2012) (stating that “[a] benefit corporation 
shall not be liable for monetary damages under this part for any failure of the benefit 
corporation to create a general or specific public benefit.”). 
 178.  See Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 109, at 613 (explaining that, if a 
benefit corporation neglects to fulfill its social mission, shareholders stand to benefit.  
Therefore, shareholders are unlikely to enforce the social mission). 
 179.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 180.  See Steven J. Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the 
Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1322 (2011) (quoting 
Corporation Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Nov. 
24, 2013) (explaining how the language of Certified B Corporations’ charters vitiates the 
ruling in Revlon)). 
 181.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14602 (West 2012). 
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Code.
182
  As a result, there is unnecessary and meaningful statutory tension 
between these two sections.
183
 
4. Treatment by Municipalities 
San Francisco’s City Council amended the San Francisco 
Administrative Code to provide an incentive for California benefit 
corporations that bid on city contracts.
184
  The bid preferences give benefit 
corporations “additional points in a graded system the city uses for bidding 
contracts.”
185
  Benefit corporations also receive a four percent discount on 
their bids from San Francisco, such that benefit corporations must receive 
public contracts when the difference in bid price between a benefit 
corporation and another business organization is less than four hundred 
basis points.
186
Philadelphia has considered similar legislation to provide 
discounts and incentives to benefit corporations bidding on public contracts 
within the city.
187
   
5. Scalability 
The scalability of benefit corporations is likely the contrepreneurs’ 
end-game and explains why the contrepreneurs targeted an economy as 
large as California, followed by the benefit corporation SEL in Delaware. 
Once Delaware began offering public benefit corporations on August 1, 
2013, the door to managers of scaled and publicly traded entities swung 
wide open.  The resulting lack of shareholder control rights in theory will 
usher in the age of “empty shareholders.” 
6. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information 
California benefit corporations must provide certain non-financial 
information to remain a benefit corporation.
188
  Yet nothing currently 
 
 182.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b) (West 2012). 
 183.  Keith P. Bishop, Forming a Benefit or Flexible Purpose Corporation? Some 
Pitfalls to Avoid, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://calcorporatelaw.com/2012/02/forming-a-benefit-or-flexible-purpose-corporation-
some-pitfalls-to-avoid/. 
 184.  S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 14C (2012). 
 185.  Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill in San Francisco, 
THE NONPROFIT TIMES (March 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-
articles/benefit-corporation-in-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco/. 
 186.  S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 14C.3 (2012). 
 187.  See Blending Profit and Purpose: The Future of Hybrid Organizations, NONPROFIT 
LAW BLOG, http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/home/2013/10/blending-profit-and-purpose-
the-future-of-hybrid-organizations.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 188.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)(2) (West 2012). 
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prevents corporations from already providing this additional information, 
and several corporations already provide this information.
189
  
D. B Lab Certified B Corps 
 
This subpart (1) suggests that the contrepreneurs behind SEL and that 
Certified B Corporations may not have been honest in their dealings with 
investors, legislators, and other stakeholders, and (2) deconstructs and 
refutes numerous of the contrepreneurs’ spurious claims.  This subpart 
concludes that while social enterprise may possess legitimate goals, SEL is 
a result of contrepreneurial marketing and brand management that appeals 
to unsophisticated equity investors. 
1. History 
SEL benefit corporations may be confused with unlegislated entities 
that claim to be “Certified B Corporations” and “Certified Benefit 
Corporations,” by virtue of having obtained B Lab’s certification.   For 
example, Professor Linda O. Smiddy indicates that Vermont had passed 
legislation applicable to two types of social enterprise, (1) the L3C and (2) 
“what is called the benefit corporation (the ‘B Corporation’ or ‘B 
Company’),” and cites B Lab’s website as the authority for Vermont 
having “enact[ed] B Corporation or B Company legislation.
190
 
2. Governance 
The legal status governing a Certified B Corporation remains static, 
regardless of whether the corporation has a B Lab certification.  Yet B Lab 
indicates that its governance and structure is the same as that of its potential 
clients.
191
  B Lab’s website appears to push the Citizens United envelope as 
 
 189. David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality 
and Divergent Disclosure, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 161 (2007) (“[T]oday many of the 
world’s largest companies produce social, environmental, or sustainability reports . . . in 
addition to their financial reports.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 190.  Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments 
in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 3 & n.2 (2010).  But see Legislation, Certified 
B Corporation (last visited Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/legislation (discussing the difference between Benefit Corporations and Certified B 
Corporations).  
191.   See Term Sheet for B Corporations, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/term_sheet_constitu
ency_states_llcs_llps_3.pdf (stating that “B Lab is governed by an independent Board of 
Directors”). 
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far as one can take the proposition for which that case stands.
192
  Indeed, 
the website often refers to a B Corporation’s “DNA,” stating, for example, 
that “[t]he value of meeting the legal requirement for B Corp certification 
is that it bakes sustainability into the DNA of your company as it grows, 
brings in outside capital, or plans succession, ensuring that your mission 
can better survive new management, new investors, or even new 
ownership.”
193
  Furthermore, B Lab is a 501(c)(3) non-profit,
194
 a status 
applied to entities that typically cannot lobby.
195
 B Lab’s pride in lobbying 
and assisting to pass SEL, however, goes so far as to include posted photos 
and names of candidates helpful to B Lab’s cause throughout its website.
196
 
3. Purpose 
B Lab’ attempts to create legislation that will coerce entities to pay 
funds to B Lab for legally questionable certification tools.  There is little 
doubt that B Lab is marketing an undefined notion of social enterprise.  
Indeed, the background of some of its highest ranking employees, such as 
Dermot Hikisch, includes marketing.
197
  Similarly, B Lab markets social 
 
 192.  Citizens United is the well-known 2010 decision in which the Supreme Court 
stated that corporations are persons for purposes of free speech protection under the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that, therefore, a federal statute prohibiting 
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the 
Constitution.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365-67 (2010).  
Roger Colinvaux indicates the concerns of applying Citizens United to charitable 
organizations. Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens 
United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 686–87 (2012) (Stating that 
“[t]he rule that charitable organizations may not ’participate in, or intervene in  .  .  . any 
political campaign’ is hardly a secret.  Since its introduction as part of the Internal Revenue 
Code in 1954, section 501(c)(3)’s ‘Political Activities Prohibition,’ as it is often called, has 
been the subject of considerable scholarly debate, practical concern, and occasional political 
wrangling.  Although the contours of the rule may be imprecise, and enforcement by the 
IRS uneven—resulting in frustration for some—arguably the rule has stood the test of time.  
Like it or not, understand it or not, it is an embedded characteristic of the charitable sector 
that charity and political activity are by law incompatible.”). 
193 .   Protect Your Mission, Certified B Corp., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/why-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission (last visited December 5, 2013). 
 194.  Powered by B Lab, GIIRS, http://giirs.org/powered-by-b-lab (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013). 
 195.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); but cf. Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421-26 (analyzing 
twenty-one factual situations and noting whether, in light of the facts, the organization is 
engaged in impermissible lobbying or other political campaign intervention). 
 196.  Passing Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORP. http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/legislation (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (web page since changed; original screen 
captures on file with author). 
 197.  Dermot Hikisch is a former sustainability ambassador for Proctor & Gamble. 
Dermot Hikisch, Sustainable Brands, http://www.sustainablebrands.com/users/dermot-
hikisch#. Proctor & Gamble has traditionally excelled in marketing. See e.g., Jack Neff, 
How P&G Reshaped the Industry From Brand Management to Digital and Beyond: World’s 
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enterprise.  
B Lab’s website states that “[b]enefit corporations operate the same as 
traditional corporations but with higher standards of corporate purpose, 
accountability, and transparency.”
198
  Not only has federal taxpayer money 
funded B Lab,
199
 but B Lab has used that federal funding to support and 
certify as “B Corporations” some controversial entities.  For example, 
Berkeley Patients Group is a medical marijuana dispensary in Berkeley and 
a Certified B Corporation.  By selling medicinal marijuana, it violates 
federal criminal law.  
4. Taxation 
Because B Lab is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity, B Lab receives federal 
tax benefits currently unavailable to any entity created under SEL.
200
 
 
 
5. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information 
 
B Lab is structured as a traditional non-profit entity and not an entity 
created under SEL, even though it would qualify under California’s benefit 
corporation statute.
201
  As a result, the sole public disclosure that B Lab 
must make is its Form 990 with the IRS.
202
   
 
Largest Advertiser Led the Way With Firsts in Radio, TV, and Tech, ADVERTISING AGE (Oct. 
29, 2012), http://adage.com/article/special-report-pg-at-175/p-g-reshaped-industry/237994/; 
American Business, 1920-2000: How It Worked - P&G: Changing the Face of Consumer 
Marketing (2000), Working Knowledge, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/1476.html (last 
visited December 5, 2013). 
 198.  The Non-Profit behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP. (2013), 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2013) (web page since removed; original screen capture on file with author). 
 199.  See Our Funders, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/1047 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (indicating that 
Certified B Corp. has received $1 million in funding from the United States Agency for 
International Development, a federal government agency,). 
200.   26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2010) (providing that an 
501(c)(3) organization is exempt from income taxation). 
201.   See The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited 
December 5, 2013); Practicing What We Preach, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/practicing-
what-we-preach (last visited December 5, 2013). 
 202.  B Lab Co., 2010 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 990) 
(June 7, 2011); B Lab Co., 2011 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 
990) (June 13, 2012). 
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6. The Non-Scalability Myth 
Contrepreneurs have claimed that social entrepreneurs cannot scale 
their businesses and look forward to the day when, under SEL, social 
enterprises can be scaled.
203
  Multiple examples, however, challenge the 
conception that social entreprenuers cannot scale their businesses under 
existing models. While the San Francisco Bay Area and Silicon Valley 
represent the West Coast’s hub of innovation and entrepreneurship,
204
 
Boston and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”) represent 
the East Coast’s hub for innovation and entrepreneurship.
205
  One part of 
MIT is its well-regarded D-Lab,
206
 founded by Amy Smith
207
 over a decade 
ago.
208
  D-Lab helps foster impactful, community-related technologies
209
 
that attempt to explore and create “economically viable solutions through 
 
 203.  DVD: Incorporating Change Symposium (Hastings Business Law Journal 2012) 
29:22–29:45 (on file with author). 
 204.  See, e.g., THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2 (Chong-Moon Lee et al., eds. 2000) (claiming “the Silicon Valley 
edge stems from an entire environment, or habitat, honed for innovation and 
entrepreneurship.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 205.  See, e.g., Phil Budden, Greater Boston: a world-class hub of entrepreneurship, 
BOSTON.COM (Dec. 14, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.boston.com/business/blogs/global-
business-hub/2012/12/greater_boston.html (stating that “Greater Boston is extremely 
fortunate both to be home to institutions that train future entrepreneurs, attracting talent 
from around the world, and to have a wide range of entrepreneurs within the city region.  
MIT  .  .  . and now Harvard (among many others) are systematically developing 
entrepreneurs, teaching them the skills to build new enterprises.”).  
 206.  MIT Courses, D-LAB (Jan. 19, 2013), http://d-lab.mit.edu/.  I almost cringe at the 
likeness between the name D-Lab and B Lab, especially given that B Lab was not 
incorporated until December 4, 2006, after D-Lab’s incorporation date.  Business Entity 
Filing History - B Lab Company, PA. DEPT. OF ST., 
https://www.corporations.state.pa.us/corp/soskb/corp.asp?2507035 (last visited Oct. 15, 
2013). 
 207.  See Sandy Pentland, Amy Smith, TIME (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1984685_1984745_1984806,0
0.html (describing Smith as one of TIME magazine’s Top 100 people who affect the world); 
Pagan Kennedy, Necessity is the Mother of Invention, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 30, 2003), 
http://www.umsl.edu/~sauterv/analysis/creativity/30MIT.html (describing Smith and her 
work). 
 208.  D-Lab celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2011-12.  D-Lab's D-ecitennial (It's Our 
10th Anniversary!), D-Lab (Nov. 23, 2011), http://d-lab.mit.edu/news/general/d-labs-d-
ecitennial-its-our-10th-anniversary (last visited December 5, 2013).; see also David L. 
Chandler, Bringing the World to Innovation: With up to $25 million in new USAID funding, 
MIT’s D-Lab will gain greater ability to help people in the developing world find their own 
solutions, MIT NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/going-inside-d-
lab-at-mit-1108.html. 
 209.  See About D-Lab, D-LAB, http://www.victorgrau.net/about (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013) (These technologies include “community water testing and treatment, clean-burning 
cooking fuels, post-harvest processing, pedal and human power production, medical devices 
for global health, mobility aids and physical rehabilitation.”). 
268 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
developmental entrepreneurship  .  .  . and continually explores new models 
for scaling-up innovation and facilitating technology access.”
210
 
The MIT and D-Lab February 2013 conference for growing social 
ventures included a panel and keynote address on the successful scaling of 
social enterprise.
211
  The panel on scaling social enterprise featured “short 
presentations by [four established social entrepreneurs] about how they 
successfully scaled from a small enterprise to a medium enterprise to a 
large enterprise and what was different about those transition phases as 
well as what tools they used to make the process easier.”
212
  The social 
enterprises that spoke at D-Lab regarding their scalability successes were 
d.light, Kopernik, SELCO, and Assure.
213
  Given the reputations of MIT, 
D-Lab, and Ms. Smith, along with the opaque definitions of social 
enterprise and scalability, I assume that these entities are successfully 
scaled social enterprises, based on the advertising of the conference by 
MIT and D-Lab.
214
  Of the five scaled entities presented at the 2013 
Conference for Growing Social Investors by Amy Smith’s D-Lab at MIT, 
not one of these scaled social entrepreneurial enterprises needed SEL to 
achieve its success, and only one of those entities—and only within the past 
year—has been certified by B Lab.
215
 
7. The “Certified B Corporations” and GIIRS Ratings Myths 
B Lab cannot give its “Certified B Corporations” legal status.  Rather,  
B Lab merely serves as an external private certifier.
216
  B Lab’s mission is 
to ensure that B Corps “meet rigorous standards of social and 
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.”
217
  B Lab 
has also analogized its function as being “what LEED certification is to 
 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  MIT Ideas Global Challenge: Scaling Development Ventures-2013 Schedule, MIT, 
http://globalchallenge.mit.edu/about/scalingdevventures/schedule (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
214.   Id. 
215.   d.light was certified by B Lab in August 2012.  d.light design, Certified B Corp., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/community/dlight-design (last visited December 5, 2013). 
 216.  See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 594 (2011) (“B Lab, of course, cannot confer 
a legal form on an organization.  By varying governance structures and conveying 
information about conforming entities, however, B Corp status appeals to social 
enterprises  .  .  .  .”). 
 217.  The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2013). 
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green building or Fair Trade certification is to coffee.”
218
  While B Lab 
offers what it contends is an independent certification, in reality, companies 
are simply paying to license B Lab’s mark of certification.   
Fee assessments become even more questionable when they relate to 
corporate law and finance.  Contrepreneurs and legislators seem to have 
failed to learn from some of the major credit ratings agencies and their 
ratings of collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) immediately preceding 
the Great Recession.
219
  Those credit rating agencies not only failed to serve 
their intended purpose but also subjected themselves to manipulation.
220
  In 
addition, should an entity get on a rating agency’s bad side—even if that 
entity is the United States of America—the rating agency may spitefully 
downgrade it.
221
 
Apparently, even the Better Business Bureau provides high ratings in 
return for cash and, conversely, low ratings to companies who would not 
pay.
222
  For example, the Better Business Bureau rated the Walt Disney 
Company an “F,” but Hamas, an organization that the U.S. government has 
designated as a foreign terrorist organization from at least 2006 until July 
 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 
1026 (2009) (noting that, although investors in residential mortgage-backed securities relied 
on the credit ratings supplied by ratings agencies, these ratings were flawed because they 
were solicited by the underwriters creating the securities); see also Steven McNamara, 
Informational Failures in Structured Finance and Dodd-Frank’s “Improvements to the 
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 665, 694-97 (2012) 
(acknowledging the fact that conflicts of interest between ratings agencies and underwriters 
greatly exacerbated the scope and length of the financial crisis but arguing that flawed 
ratings models were perhaps the primary “germ of the ratings disaster”). 
 220.  See, e.g., John W. Uhlein, Breakdown in the Mortgage Securitization Market: 
Multiple Causes and Suggestions for Reform, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 503, 515–518 (2010) 
(describing the conflict of interest arising from the influence of borrowers and issuers, who 
both paid the ratings agencies and received ratings of their products). 
 221.  See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Was S&P downgrade an act of revenge?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 
9, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/08/09/7321296-was-sp-
downgrade-an-act-of-revenge?lite (examining whether the downgrade of U.S. Treasury debt 
by the credit rating agency S&P—despite no similar downgrade by the other two major 
rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch—was a vengeful act by S&P). 
 222.  See Joseph Rhee, Terror Group Gets ‘A’ Rating form Better Business Bureau?, 
ABC NEWS  (Nov. 12, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/business-bureau-best-ratings-
money-buy/story?id=12123843 (reporting on an accusation that the Better Business Bureau 
was engaged in a “‘pay for play’ scheme in which A plus ratings [were] awarded to those 
who pa[id] membership fees, and F ratings used to punish those who d[idn’t]”); see also 
Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney Gen. for the State of Conn., to Alan Cohen, Vice 
President and Gen. Counsel for the Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, (Nov. 10, 2010), 
available at http://ctwatchdog.com/business/ct-attorney-general-threatens-legal-action-
against-better-business-bureau (expressing concern over Better Business Bureau’s rating 
practices). 
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2012,
223
 secured an “A-” rating.
224
  No reason exists to believe that B Lab 
would engage in more ethical behavior. 
  
 
 223.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2011 (2012) (designating an entity 
as a foreign terrorist organization only if it:  (a) engages in terrorist activity as defined in (i) 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), (ii) 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), or (iii) retains the capability of, and 
intends to engage in, terrorism that threatens U.S. national security); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, PUB. NO. 11324, COUNTRY REPORTS 
ON TERRORISM 2005 passim (2006) (mentioning Hamas as a terrorist organization). 
 224.  See Rhee, supra note 2221 (questioning the authenticity of Better Business 
Bureau’s rating system); see also Letter from Richard Blumenthal, supra note 2221 
(addressing concerns over Business Bureau’s rating practices). 
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8. B Lab Certification as “Inside-the-Box” Nontrepreneurial 
Thinking
225
 
Former management consultant-turned-stand-up comedian Colm 
O’Regan employed the phrase “box-ticking exercise” to define post-
Sarbanes-Oxley business actors who undertake “the motions of 
compliance . . . to get regulators off their back” that are otherwise 
meaningless.  O’Reagan likened this process to the computer-based 
training (“CBT”) courses that many businesses employ.  Specifically, 
O’Reagan stated: 
[a]s anyone who has ever done a CBT will testify, the way to 
complete it is to not really ready anything.  You just keep 
clicking ‘Next,’ and when it gets to the quiz bit, keep on re-
taking the quiz until you get the questions right . . . And I 
suppose you might call that ‘thinking inside the box.’
226
 
Similarly, B Lab’s computer-generated questionnaire, required of 
companies wishing to receive a B Corporation certification, represents a 
form of check-the-box behavior, which has led to recent material concerns 
regarding the vulnerability of corporate stakeholders relying on those 
certifications.
227
 
To receive certification from B Lab, a benefit corporation must meet 
the performance requirement as set forth in the B Impact Assessment.
228
  
The B Impact Assessment addresses corporate accountability, transparency, 
compensation and wages for employees, corporate giving, and 
 
 225.  Colm O’Regan, Banking Black Hole (BBC World radio broadcast Dec. 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0121841. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Compare B-Lab Self-Assessment, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/b_lab_self_assessment.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2013) (listing the factors for assessing a company under B Lab standards) 
with PICK N PAY, SUSTAINABLE LIVING REPORT 2010/2011 (2012), available at 
http://www.picknpay-ir.co.za/downloads/2012/pick_n_pay_report.pdf (reporting the values 
of an African retailer company).  See also Stephanie Clifford & Steven Greenhouse, Fast 
and Flawed Inspections of Factories Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, at 1 (describing the 
many recent high grades that presaged global failures in “perfunctory ‘check-the-box’ 
audit[ing]” of ethics, labor and environmental conditions, and other stakeholder concerns 
relevant to social enterprise; yet describing how companies that monitor other enterprises 
have become a “booming business” in the past two decades, with several such companies’ 
share prices rising more than fifty percent in the past two years, thereby emphasizing a 
likely end-game for B Lab, and further quoting a Harvard researcher regarding third-party 
company audits:  “It starts as a dream, then it becomes an organization, and it finally ends 
up as a racket”; and also quoting an executive at a nonprofit monitoring group:  “‘[i]f it’s a 
check-the-box inspection, you better have the right boxes to look at . . . .’”). 
 228.  How to Become a B Corp, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Oct. 26, 
2013). 
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environmental impact.
229
  The number of questions and weighting of 
responses depends upon the size and industry of the company and the 
assessment is estimated to take only sixty to ninety minutes to complete 
online.
230
  The subject enterprise need only score eighty points out of two 
hundred to achieve B Lab’s certification.
231
  Short of the sport of baseball—
where, for example, Boston Red Sox Hall of Fame left fielder Ted 
Williams maintained a career batting average of .344 and who remains the 
most recent player to achieve an over .400 average
232
—a forty percent 
success rate is rarely considered laudable, let alone worthy of certification. 
Even after passing the B Impact Assessment and being granted a B 
Corp mark from B Lab, the Certified B Corp must pay to license the mark.  
B Lab uses a sliding scale based on the benefit corporation’s annual sales, 
but certified B Corps may be forced to pay up to $25,000 per year to use 
the B Corp certification.
233
  B Lab’s annual certification fees are as 
follows
234
: 
 
BENEFIT CORPORATION’S ANNUAL 
SALES 
ANNUAL LICENSE FEE 
$0 - $1,999,999 $500 
$2,000,000 - $4,999,999 $1,000 
$5,000,000 - $9,999,999 $2,500 
$10,000,000 - $19,999,999 $5,000 
$20,000,000 - $49,999,999 $10,000 
$50,000,000 - $99,999,999 $15,000 
$100,000,000+ $25,000 
 
 
 229.  B-Lab Self-Assessment, supra note 227. 
 230.  The B Impact Ratings System, FOUND. CENTER, 
http://trasi.foundationcenter.org/record.php?SN=29 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 231.  See How to Become a B Corp, supra note 228 (describing how to earn the B Corp 
certification). 
 232.  Ted Williams Player Page, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/players/w/willite01.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).  A batting average of 
.344 means that the player averaged a hit 34.4 percent of the times he was at bat.  The 
average baseball batting averages are between .250 and .270.  League by League Totals for 
Batting Average, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/hitting/hibavg4.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2013); see also Steve Goodman, 
The Dying Cubs Fan’s Last Request, on AFFORDABLE ART (RED PAJAMAS RECORDS, 1979) 
(stating that “the law of averages says that anything will happen that can, but the last time 
[something happened in baseball occurred around] the year we dropped the bomb on 
Japan.”). 
 233.  Make it Official, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/120 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 234.  Id. 
2013] EXAMINING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGISLATION 273 
 
B Corp certification lasts for two years, and enterprises may recertify.
235
 
Several factors raise legitimate questions as to whether B Lab should 
possess 501(c)(3) status.  First, according to several sources, B Lab has 
been lobbying to pass legislation.
236
  Yet a 501(c)(3) nonprofit generally 
cannot be used to achieve a political or legislative purpose.
237
  How closely 
B Lab’s activities comport with the permitted legislative lobbying 
permitted in the I.R.C. thus remains questionable. 
Second, as indicated earlier, B Lab certified an entity that has openly 
violated federal drug laws for years.
238
  Also, B Lab’s position that 
certification and rating agencies provide social value raises a material 
question as to why B Lab itself, as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, has failed to 
obtain the seal of approval from Guidestar.
239
  As a result, B Lab appears 
hypocritical in believing that it itself does not need to obtain certifications 
when B Lab is actively pushing for legislation that mandates others to 
obtain such certifications. 
Similar challenges exist in seeing the ratings benefit—or the nonprofit 
justification—relative to B Lab’s wholly owned subsidiary GIIRS, which 
provides social benefit ratings.  B Lab includes a link to GIIRS on its 
“Attract Investors” webpage.
240
  B Lab describes GIIRS as a “[d]isregarded 
[e]ntity” in Schedule R to B Lab’s 2012 Form 990 IRS filing, a public 
 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  See Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional 
Governance Mechanisms can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 170, 185 (2012) (mentioning B Lab’s continuous efforts to lobby for 
legislation); Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CRS 
WIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-
First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation#; Sledge, supra note 172. 
 237.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 238.  See Berkeley Patients Group B Impact Report, (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://old.bcorporation.net/index.cfm/fuseaction/company.report/ID/6d7aa0c6-866d-4677-
810d-e10bf89fe84c (giving the 2009 rating for Berkeley Patients Group, a company that 
produces medical cannabis, a schedule 1 drug under 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C) (2006) for 
which “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under 
medical supervision”).  Potential First Amendment issues aside, any questions concerning 
whether 501(c)(3) entities should carry a charitable federal tax status while generating 
revenues from funds derived from the sale of federally illegal drugs is beyond this Article’s 
scope.  For more on the conflict between federal and state law relative to this issue, see 
Jared Willis, The Hazy Cloud Engulfing Cultivation, Possession, and Transportation of 
Aggregate Amounts of Collectively Cultivated Medical Marijuana Pursuant to California 
Health and Safety Code Section 11362.775, 40 WASH. ST. U. L. REV. 135 (2013). 
 239. GuideStar rates 501(c)(3)s. B-Lab Company, GUIDESTAR, 
http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/20-5958773/b-lab-company.aspx (last visited Oct. 
26, 2013). 
 240.  Attract Investors, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/why-become-a-b-corp/attract-investors (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing that B 
Corps receive free GIIRS ratings). 
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document required of all 501(c)(3) entities.
241
  And GIIRS—directly 
controlled by B Lab—states in section 1.13 of the massive disclaimers and 
warnings on its website entry page: 
[R]atings . . . are statements of opinion . . . and not statements of 
fact or recommendations to . . . make any investment decisions.  
The GIIRS Parties assume no obligation to update the Content 
following publication in any form or format.  The Content should 
not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and 
experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors 
and/or clients
242
 when making investment and other business 
decisions.  The Content is for informational purposes and . . . 
GIIRS’s opinions and analyses do not address the suitability of 
any security . . . .  GIIRS does not act as a fiduciary . . . .  GIIRS 
does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due 
diligence or independent verification of any information it 
receives.
243
 
Also of interest is the fact that only four law firms included by B Lab 
as impliedly an approved B Corp is Hanson Bridgett, LLP.  Attorney 
Jonathan Storper’s of Hanson Bridgett helped pass California’s Benefit 
Corporation statute.
244
  Material hosted on B Lab’s website at one time 
regarding Hanson Bridgett stated, 
we are not only fulfilling our responsibility as lawyers; we are 
doing our part to create a more sustainable world.  [Our B Lab 
certified clients] are diligently engaged to make improvements in 
the following areas:  Clean Technologies; Socially Responsible 
Investing . . . .  Hanson Bridgett LLP is offering a 10% discount 
off our rates to help our fellow B Corporations with their legal 
issues.
245
 
 
 241.  B Lab 2011 Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax (Sched. R to Form 
990) (June 13, 2012), available at 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/205/205958773/205958773_201112_990.
pdf.  A “disregarded entity” means that the parent organization—in this case, B Lab—is the 
sole member in an LLC.  Thus, the LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary.  Single Member 
Limited Liability Companies, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Single-Member-Limited-Liability-Companies (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 242.  These entities seem to be stakeholders, not stockholders. 
 243.  GIIRS Terms and Conditions, supra note 168 (emphasis added). 
244.   Interview: Jonathan Storper, Partner at Hanson Bridgett LLP and Involved in 
Passage of CA Benefit Corporation Legislation, INNOV8SOCIAL (March 13, 2013), 
http://www.innov8social.com/2013/03/interview-jonathan-storper-partner-at.html. 
 245.  10% Discount for B Corporations, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/ServicePartners/HansonBridgett_B_
Corp_offer.pdf (cached version last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (accessed by searching for 
“Hanson 10% Discount for B Corporations” in Google and viewing cached version); 
Hanson Bridgett LLP, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/hanson-
bridgett-llp (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
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Interestingly, Hanson Bridgett also claims to be “uniquely qualified to 
serve clients of all sizes to . . . [c]ounsel[] and advis[e] investors (angel, 
venture capital and others)” to part with their money.
246
  The contact 
information listed at the bottom of the page leads to Mr. Storper. 
But Hanson Bridgett is not alone.  A firm called Rimon also offers  “to 
help advance the missions of . . . fellow B Corporations” by offering a 25 
percent discount off its usual rates.
247
 Vox Legal claims to provide 
“[i]nnovative legal counsel for world-changing companies” by 
“deliver[ing] [a] great return on your legal investment by doing exactly 
what you need and nothing more.”
248
  These claims involve questionable 
advertising practices under professional responsibility rules. They may also 
amount to impermissible referral fees. 
9. Contextualizing Contrepreneurs’ Tactics and Attempts to Silence 
Counter Narratives 
A demonstration of how two of the major proponents of SEL attempt 
to silence the counter narrative helps contextualize why California’s 
legislature ultimately passed two forms of SEL.  A symposium held by the 
University of Hastings College of the Law featured Hanson Bridgett’s 
Jonathan Storper,
249
 as the moderator of its approximately sixty-minute 
“SEL and politics” panel.
250
  Storper, who conducted a forty-five minute 
 
 246.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 247.  25% Discount for B Corporations, RIMON LAW, 
http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/ServicePartners/Rimon_B_Corp_Affi
liate_Offer1.pdf. (cached version last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (accessed by searching for 
“Rimon offers a 25% discount off” in Google and viewing cached version).  Law firms are 
not necessarily prohibited from choosing a corporate entity form so long as they are not 
publicly traded.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2011) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in a law firm partnership with a non-lawyer).  However, choosing to 
become a Certified B Corporation seems to tow the ethical line because it requires the firm 
to amend its operating documents to refrain from putting any particular constituent’s 
interests higher than the next.  This conflicts with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE [2] (2011) (requiring a lawyer, 
“[a]s advocate, [to] zealously assert[] the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
system”) with Corporation Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-
roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (requiring a Director, in 
discharging his or her duties, to determine “the best interests of the corporation” without 
regard to one particular interest group). 
 248.  VOXLEGAL, http://www.voxlegal.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (emphasis in 
original). 
 249.  Our Attorneys, Jonathan Storper, HANSONBRIDGETT,  
http://www.hansonbridgett.com/Our-Attorneys/jonathan-s-storper.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 
2013). 
 250.  DVD: Incorporating Change Symposium, supra note 2032. 
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pro-SEL presentation earlier in the symposium, spoke for an additional 
twelve and a half minutes as the “moderator.”  Storper then permitted an 
additional twenty-nine minutes of pro-SEL advocacy from panelist—and 
Storper’s former co-author—William H. (Bill) Clark, the self-professed 
“person that wrote the model [SEL] and [who] has been involved in writing 
the statutes in every state that it’s passed.”
251
  By contrast, Storper 
permitted the sole panelist articulating the counter narrative against SEL to 
speak for less than than ninety seconds before interrupting him.
252
  
Combined, Storper and Clark reinforced the dominant narrative by 
speaking for approximately seventy percent of the time allocated to four 
discussants and one moderator.  SEL advocates also engage in this type of 
political advocacy in legislatures, such as Nevada, where not one opposing 
viewpoint testified, despite requests to do so.
253
   
E. Synthesis 
The exacerbation of separation of ownership and control that SEL 
inherently creates, whether at a scaled or non-scaled level, may raise 
concerns for economists who subscribe to Friedman’s
254
 or Keynes’
255
 
theories.  The material purpose and tax aims of these organizations can be 
 
 251.  Id.  See also WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE 
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC (Nov. 16, 2011), 
available at http://benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper. 
 252.  DVD: Incorporating Change Symposium, supra note 2032. 
253.   Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Seventy-Seventh 
Session, February 25, 2013, Nevada Legislature, 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/Assembly/JUD/Final/316.pdf (last 
visited December 5, 2013). 
 254.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that one of Friedman’s most 
enduring quotes is that a business has only one social responsibility:  “to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game”). 
 255.  See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics Nobel Laureate, Keynote Address at World 
Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics: Whither Reform? Ten Years 
of the Transition (Apr. 28 1999) (paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, Apr. 28-30, 1999) (stating that “[a] point arrives . . . at which the 
owners of the capital, i.e., the shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the 
management, with the result that the direct personal interest of the latter in the making of the 
great profit becomes quite secondary”) (quoting JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN 
PERSUASION 314 (Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1932)).  Stiglitz also stated, “the shorter the 
agency chain, the easier it is to resolve the corporate governance problem.”  Id. at 13.  
However, Stiglitz assumed that a potential solution to this problem would be privatization to 
stakeholders who have long-term relationships with the enterprise, which could allow 
stakeholders a way to “exercise ‘corporate governance,’” id. at 16; however, as discussed in 
this Article, the position of the stakeholder in SEL exacerbates, rather than tightens, the 
agency chain. 
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achieved by existing business law structures, particularly because entities 
created by state law cannot alter the federal taxation schemes relative to 
invested equity capital and distributions to owners.  Despite the ostensible 
social good inherent in the names ascribed to SEL-related enterprises, these 
organizations structurally exacerbate equity investors’ ability to control 
corporate agents effectively, thereby leading to less disclosure of agent 
activity and reduced ownership control capabilities.  SEL creates statutory 
inconsistencies regarding otherwise settled corporate law.  Finally, while 
corporate law has developed over hundreds of years, LLC law, for 
example, has unfolded only since the mid-1990s and remains an often 
unsettled hodgepodge of corporate and partnership law.
256
  As a result, no 
further need exists to create additional confused, unsettled, internally 
inconsistent, and unnecessary business laws via SEL. 
III. GLOBAL CASE STUDIES 
This Part analyzes two global case studies of non- or quasi-Western 
developing economies.  These studies are admittedly anecdotal, but they 
nonetheless (1) help to demonstrate that outside of the U.S., a consistent 
corporate code provides material opportunities for publicly traded 
enterprises to maximize stakeholder value and profits, and (2) illustrate 
that, as in other countries, the justifications for new corporate forms in the 
U.S. are unnecessary and baseless. 
A. Asia—Bangladesh—PRAN 
1. Background 
Bangladesh maintains traditional fiduciary duties as Western law may 
view them, with some additions.  For example, Bangladesh employs 
phrases such as “liability of directors,” “breach of trust,” or “deprive the 
shareholders [ ] of a reasonable return on their investment” in addition to 
duties of loyalty and conflicts of interest.
257
 
Sections 108, 118, 124, and 130 of the Bangladesh Companies Act of 
1994 provide historical context regarding the purpose of the Act and 
managerial duties.
258
  If the government has reason to believe that the 
managing agent of a public company has violated laws applicable to 
management, then the government may conduct investigations and issue 
 
 256.  CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDE TO DOMESTIC JOINT VENTURES § 7:11 (2013 ed.). 
 257.  Companies Act of 1994 §§ 102, 118 (Bangl.), available at www.pdf-
archive.com/2012/11/06/companies-act/companies-act.pdf . 
 258.  Id. 
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fines.
259
  Corporations must submit reports to the government if asked by a 
government investigator and change management’s agreements and duties 
relative to the corporation.
260
 
2. Case Study 
The Programme for Rural Advancement Nationally (“PRAN”) 
represents Bangladesh’s largest grower of fruits and vegetables
261
 in a 
permissible stakeholder-centric enterprise.  PRAN’s corporate aim is to 
“generate employment and earn dignity and self-respect for [its] 
compatriots through profitable enterprises” with a vision of “improving 
livelihood.”
262
  PRAN’s corporate values, however, include nods to 
consumers, suppliers, employees, and others in the trade.
263
  Its corporate 
mission embodies “corporate social responsibilities with the additional 
compulsion to make profits . . . to thrive and grow . . . to fulfill its corporate 
social responsibilities in greater measure as time passes.  PRAN has a 
bifocal objective of making profits through the fulfillment of corporate 
social responsibilities.”
264
  PRAN’s concept is to “fight poverty & hunger 
in Bangladesh in the shortest possible time through employment 
generation.”
265
  PRAN’s equity continues to pay dividends and trades on 
the e-NRB Platform.
266
   
Finally, in the same webpage where PRAN discusses social 
responsibilities that correspond with generating profits, PRAN specifically 
articulates that these purposes all stemmed from the region’s “comparative 
advantage.”
267
 This attitude illustrates the difference between approaches to 
social businesses in Bangladesh and in the United States; it is the 
antithetical economic concept
268
 against which North Carolina, for 
example, passed its L3C statute.
269
  Simply put, as a case study of corporate 
 
259.   Id. at §§ 118, 130. 
 260.  Id. at §§ 108, 118. 
 261.  Our Inception, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/our_inception.php (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2013). 
 262.  Our Mission & Vision, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/mission_vision.php (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2013). 
 263.  Our Corporate Values, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/corporate_values.php 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013). 
 264.  Corporate Social Responsibility, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/csr.php (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  About Us, E-NRB, http://www.e-nrb.com/pages/about_us (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). 
 267.  Our Inception, supra note 261. 
268.   See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (asserting that protectionist 
legislation underpins some SEL and prolongs comparative disadvantages). 
 269.  See supra notes 122129 and accompanying text  (discussing the benefits of the 
Ricardian economic theory of comparative advantage, particularly for developing 
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governance, law, and development economics, PRAN provides strong 
evidence that Ricardian or Neo-Ricardian comparative advantage theory 
can not only coexist with—but, more importantly, serve as the basis for—
global social enterprise development. 
B. Africa—South Africa—Pick ‘N Pay 
Since the democratization of South Africa fewer than twenty years 
ago, the country’s law on corporations has also changed.  Through new 
legislation, including the Companies Act of 2008 and the King Report on 
Corporate Governance, South Africa has broadened the interests directors 
must consider when making decisions.
270
 
The Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform provide that “[n]ew 
company law should therefore be consistent not only with the Constitution 
of South Africa and the principles of equality and fairness that it enshrines, 
but also with other laws that have been enacted . . . .”
271
 
One South African legal scholar has written that as South Africa has 
grown into a democracy, there has been a need to move past a system that 
favored shareholder primacy.  As he noted: 
With time it became obvious that the principles of traditional 
corporate governance were failing.  With the growth and impact 
of companies on social and other issues, stricter and more-
inclusive measures had to be adopted for better corporate 
governance which take account not only of the shareholders, but 
also the imbalances of the past which were created by 
segregation laws.
272
 
That scholar further suggested that a modern corporation in South Africa 
must seek more than profit; rather, he wrote, “[t]he dismantling of 
apartheid brought with it the realization that companies were not operating 
in a vacuum.  The shibboleths of the exclusive or ‘shareholder supremacy 
 
economies, and why protectionism represents a poor justification for SEL). 
270.   The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (S. Afr.); King Report on Corp. Governance for S. 
Afr. 2002, King Comm. on Corp. Governance, Code of Corp. Practices & Conduct, p. 21, ¶. 
1.1 (Mar. 2002) available at 
http://library.ufs.ac.za/dl/userfiles/documents/Information_Resources/KingII%20Final%20d
oc.pdf. 
 271.  DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., GOV’T GAZETTE NO. 26493, SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM (2004) 
[hereinafter SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY] available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/notices/2004/26493.pdf.  See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, 
pmbl. 
 272.  Tshepo Mongalo, South Africanizing Company Law for a Modern Global 
Economy, 121 SALJ 93, 114 (2004). 
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at all costs’ approach were revealed.”
273
 
South Africa addressed corporate governance in the country through 
the King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa.
274
  The 
committee’s recommendations were published in the Code of Corporate 
Practices and Conduct.
275
  Interestingly, no statutory underpinning for the 
Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct exists; rather, the code has 
adopted a scheme of self-regulation.
276
 Under this scheme, affected 
companies
277
 must either comply with every provision of the code, or 
identify areas of non-compliance and state the reasons for non-compliance 
in the company’s annual report.
278
 
Emphasizing the need for good corporate governance in South Africa, 
the Committee cited a McKinsey & Co. study, finding that more than 
eighty-four percent of global institutional investors would pay a premium 
for shares of a company with good corporate governance over a company 
with poor corporate governance and comparable financial information.
279
 
The King Committee recommended that “[t]he board should ensure 
that the company complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of 
business practice, and that it communicates with its shareowners and 
relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and promptly and with 
substance over prevailing form.”
280
  The Committee’s recommendation thus 
urged companies to maintain a good relationship with their stakeholders.  
The Code also makes it clear that the company is ultimately responsible to 
its shareholders, stating that “[t]he essential principle advanced by the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance that ‘directors and 
boards owe their fiduciary duty to the company and thereby are 
accountable to shareholders, as owners of the corporation’s capital’ 
remains paramount.”
281
 
South Africa’s Companies Act of 2008 includes a partial codification 
of the directors’ duties.
282
  Should the company run into financial distress 
 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. at 102. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  King Report on Corp. Governance for S. Afr. 2002, King Comm. on Corp. 
Governance, Code of Corp. Practices & Conduct, p. 21, ¶. 1.1 (Mar. 2002) available at 
http://library.ufs.ac.za/dl/userfiles/documents/Information_Resources/KingII%20Final%20d
oc.pdf [hereinafter King Report 2002] (stating that affected companies include all securities 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, banks, financial services companies, insurance 
companies, and public sector agencies and enterprises covered by the Public Finance 
Management Act and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Act). 
 278.  Mongalo, supra note 272, at 102. 
 279.  King Report 2002, supra note 277, at 13. 
 280.  Id. at 22. 
 281.  Id. at 98 (emphasis in original). 
 282.  See The Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 76(3) (S. Afr.). 
2013] EXAMINING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGISLATION 281 
 
and enter a business rescue regime to rehabilitate the business, then the 
company must consider “affected person[s]”, a category which extends 
beyond shareholders.
283
  Included among the affected persons that the 
company must consider are:  shareholders and creditors of the company, 
trade unions representing employees of the company, and employees of the 
company not represented by a trade union (or those employees’ 
representatives).
284
  In the event that a company seeks to dispose of its 
assets, relevant law indicates that “[a]ny part of the undertaking or assets of 
a company to be disposed of, as contemplated in this section, must be given 
its fair market value as at the date of the proposal, in accordance with the 
financial reporting standards.”
285
  Regarding takeovers, if the company 
receives an offer, the target company’s board cannot frustrate the offer.
286
 
The government report also suggested that corporate disclosure extend 
beyond shareholders.
287
  The report recommends that other constituencies, 
such as employees and creditors, be able to access such information.
288
  
Moreover, the report not only does not limit disclosure to financial 
information, but also suggests that reports also include “statements on 
compliance with public interest legislation, including the Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, environmental regulation and labour regulation [that 
are] generally described as Triple Bottom Line Accounting.”
289
  In addition, 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange also mandates all listed companies to 
issue integrated reports including their Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (“ESG”) factors.
290
 
In terms of a case study, Pick ‘N Pay (“PNP”) has remained organized 
as a typical corporation under the prevailing laws of South Africa since its 
founding in 1968.  PNP is a major retailer in South Africa.
291
  Its core 
principles consist of the following: 
[m]aintaining abiding values, in spite of business practices 
changing with time[;] [f]ostering respect for individuals, not as a 
strategic advantage, but because it is morally correct[;] 
 
 283.  Id. at § 128(1). 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. at § 112(4). 
 286.  See id. at § 126(1)(a)(ii)(“[T]he board [ ] must not take any action . . . that could 
effectively result in [ ] a bona fide offer being frustrated.”). 
 287.  SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 271, at 41. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Institute of Dirs. S. Afr., The Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa 
(CRISA) (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=crisa; see also What is 
ESG?, ESG MANAGERS PORTFOLIOS, 
http://www.esgmanagers.com/sustainable_investing/what_is_esg (last visited Oct. 23, 
2013)(defining and describing ESG). 
 291.  About Us, PICK N PAY, http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/about-us-
introduction (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
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[a]cknowledging the difference between timeless principles and 
daily business practices[;] [and] [s]ticking to values—even if this 
appears to put us at a competitive disadvantage.
292
 
In post-Apartheid South Africa, PNP maintains its position that: 
The more economic freedom that exists within South African 
society, the more scope there will be for growth in the retail 
market.  It is no surprise that our view is the same as it was at our 
inception—big business must work together towards securing the 
economic security and social wellbeing of generations to come.
293
 
PNP includes a corporate social initiative in which it funds what it 
believes to be socially beneficial enterprises such as developing parks or 
providing incubators to hospitals in need.
294
  PNP is devoted to sustainable 
living causes, proactively publishing a detailed, yet unrequired, manual on 
its sustainable living activities and so-called green issues.
295
  The South 
African government has certified PNP stores as contributors to Black 
Enterprise Empowerment (BEE).
296
 
Despite engaging in numerous voluntary stakeholder-centric activities, 
PNP remains a publicly traded entity on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE),
297
 pays a regular dividend to its shareholders,
298
 and generates 
positive Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization 
(“EBITDA”),
299
 a metric generally associated with cash flow.
300
  PNP’s 
stakeholder pledge includes employees, customers, the country and local 
communities, suppliers, and shareholders.  Yet again, no law, rule, or 
regulation prevents a traditional publicly traded U.S. corporation from 
 
 292.  Fundamental Principles, PICK N PAY, 
http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/fundamental-principles (last visited Oct. 23, 
2013). 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  CSI, PICK N PAY, http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/CSI (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2013). 
 295.  PICK N PAY, SUSTAINABLE LIVING REPORT 2010/2011 (2012), supra note 227. 
 296.  BEE Certification, PICK N PAY, 
http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/bee-certification (last visited Oct. 23, 
2013). 
 297.  See Pick’n Pay Holdings, Ltd, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/PWK:SJ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (displaying stock 
chart and key statistics for PNP). 
 298.  Director’s Report, PICK N PAY, http://www.picknpay-
ir.co.za/financials/annual_reports/2012/financials/stores-directors-report.php (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2013). 
 299.  Id. 
300.   How to Value Stocks: Cash Flow-Based Valuations, The Motley Fool, 
http://www.fool.com/investing/beginning/how-to-value-stocks-cash-flow-based-
valuations.aspx (last visited December 5, 2013). 
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engaging in these activities outside of an auction context,
301
 and no law, 
rule, or regulation prohibits a publicly traded U.S. LLC from engaging in 
these activities in any situation.
302
 
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SOCIAL BENEFIT AND WHOSE 
STANDARD APPLIES? 
Some legal scholars, politicians, and cabinet-level officials have 
argued that investment in renewable energy enterprises undertakings 
ostensibly has a “‘beneficial’ purpose.”
303
  Entrepreneurial startups, 
whether in their early or late stages, are often geographically bounded and 
typically funded by local private investment.
304
  Although “state VCs” 
exist,
305
 the federal government’s funding of purported socially beneficial 
green energy companies such as Solyndra
306
 demonstrates that, as former 
Harvard President and Obama Administration Chief Economic Advisor 
Lawrence Summers wrote in an email, “gov[ernment] is a crappy VC.”
307
   
The abstract idea of socially beneficial business organizations may 
appeal to many liberal- or progressive-minded people who oppose 
traditional corporation excesses.  In practice, however, SEL can whipsaw 
these people’s preconceptions because of legislative flaws that obscure 
what constitutes social beneficence.  Positing what could occur under 
California’s general and specific public benefit SEL definitions is 
instructive.  In examining what may constitute a public benefit, this Part 
explores the nexus of four of those categories’ pertinent parts:  (1) 
promoting the advancement of knowledge; (2) increasing the flow of 
 
 301.  See STOUT, supra note 18, at 24-32. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for 
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 777 (2012). 
 304.  See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 717, 731 (2010) (indicating that “Facebook . . . moved to Silicon Valley” despite its 
inception in both capital- and entrepreneur-friendly Boston). 
 305.  Id. at 737. 
 306.  Matthew Lynley, Peter Thiel: Clean technology is a “disaster”, VENTUREBEAT 
(Sept. 12, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/09/12/thiel-cleantech-disaster-
disrupt (expressing that Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal and early investor in Facebook, 
views clean technology as a fad-like “disaster” in which private investor capital held little 
remaining interest). 
 307.  David Groshoff, If Lawrence Summers believed that the “Gov is a crappy VC,” 
could the government have been a better Distressed Investor?, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG 
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/10/if-lawrence-summers-believed-
that-the-gov-is-a-crappy-vc-could-the-government-have-been-a-better-dis.html; see also 
Roberta Rampton & Mark Hosenball, In Solyndra note, Summers said Feds “crappy” 
investor, REUTERS.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://reuters.com/article/2011/10/03/us-
solyndra-idUSTRE7925C520111003. 
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capital to entities with a public benefit purpose
308
; (3) improving human 
health; and (4) accomplishing any other particular benefit for society. 
A. Promoting the Advancement of Knowledge 
Public charter schools present an example of entities that mix various 
profit models, including non-profit and quasi-for-profit.  
A 2009 publication, Investing in Charter Schools: A Guide for 
Donors,
309
 attempts to steer donor-investor capital to particular charter 
schools by asking donors to “provide funds to ‘brand-name’ charter 
management organizations (CMOs) so they [could] open new charter 
schools in the community.”
310
  This quasi-prospectus or private placement 
memorandum employs many of the latest buzzwords such as emphasizing 
that “CMOs[] are the ‘brands’ of the charter sector, with quality control and 
cost efficiencies.”
311
 The report distinguishes between (1) CMOs that are 
nonprofits and (2) EMOs, an acronym representing for-profit “Educational 
Management Organizations.”
312
  The report is primarily concerned with 
CMOs, but also discusses KIPP,
313
 a national chain of charter schools 
whose acronym stands for “Knowledge is Power Program.”
314
 
Throughout this donor-investor guide, the authors sprinkle the 
 
 308.  SeeStudio B with Shepard Smith (FoxNews television broadcast Aug. 5, 2012).  
BP, in its commercial, displayed serious commitment to environmental issues and took 
credit for social benefits that turned out to be a blatant lie when BP pleaded guilty to 
multiple charges filed by the Department of Justice in November 2012.  Even the reporters 
on the Fox News Channel, a typically pro-corporate media outlet, indicated that BP “lied to 
our faces, and we knew it.”  In January 2013, BP officially pleaded guilty to manslaughter 
for killing several people.  It would seem that BP’s marketing pitch would be sufficient to 
obtain a B Corp. Certification or form as a Benefit Corporation.  Yet what is one to do, put a 
stock certificate in a prison?  Revoke a corporate charter? 
 309.  Julie Kowal, Bryan C. Hassel & Sarah Crittenden, Investing in Charter Schools: A 
Guide for Donors (prepared for the Philanthropy Roundtable by Public Impact, 2d ed. 
2009), available at http://publicimpact.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/Investing_in_Charter_Schools__A_Guide_for_Donors.pdf. 
 310.  Id. at 23. 
 311.  Id. at 29 (stating further, “[n]ot only do brands signal valuable information to 
consumers, but they also create powerful incentives for their owners to maintain quality to 
keep the brand-name strong.  Perhaps most importantly, brands can achieve economies of 
scale that make them more efficient than stand-alone shops”). 
 312.  Kowal, Hassel & Crittenden, supra note 3099, at 30. 
 313.  See id. at 30 (“One national brand that has received support from many funders is 
the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP).”). 
 314.  Id.  For more on KIPP and charter schools, see David Groshoff, Unchartered 
Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional Collision with Entrepreneurial Sex-
Segregated Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 324, 327 [hereinafter 
Entrepreneurial Charter Schools]; see also Stephanie Y. Brown, Law Teaching and Social 
Justice: Teaching Until the Change Comes, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 195, 203 n.50 
(describing the process of “KIPPnotizing” students to adhere to KIPP’s methods). 
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business verbiage of “seed capital,”
315
 “venture philanthropy,”
316
 “value-
added,”
317
 “venture philanthropy fund,”
318
 and “incubators.”
319
  The authors 
additionally quote a major funder of charter schools as stating, “[l]ike 
venture capital funds . . . we take board seats [at the schools] and become 
active investors, working with the entrepreneurs we support to build 
sustainable world-class organizations.”
320
  As described in Entrepreneurial 
Charter Schools, charter schools provide educational entrepreneurs with an 
ability to implement innovative techniques.
321
  Another benefit of charter 
schools is that most states that authorize them allow them to create a 
competitive market for human and financial capital, after years of a failed 
government monopoly, particularly in urban areas.
322
 
But of the seventeen “world-class organizations” supported by the 
educational venture capitalists NewSchools
323
 foundation and the sixteen 
recipients of funding from the Charter School Growth Fund
324
 prominently 
mentioned in the pamphlet, none received acknowledgment from the 
Principal Investigator of Harvard University’s Chartering Practice Project, 
Dr. Katherine K. Merseth, in her analysis of high-performing charter 
schools, such as MATCH.
325
   
  
 
 315.  Kowal, Hassel & Crittenden, supra note 309, at 24. 
 316.  Id. at 32. 
 317.  Id. at 105. 
 318.  Id. at 44. 
 319.  Id. at 33. 
 320.  Id. at 34. 
 321.  Entreprenurial Charter Schools, supra note 314, at 325. 
 322.  See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Charter Schools, supra note 314 passim (explaining that 
the flexibility and independence enjoyed by charter schools allows them to operate on the 
basis of accountability and competition, rather than government monopoly); Kowal, Hassel 
& Crittenden, supra note 309, passim (discussing how charter schools have proven 
themselves especially effective in improving K-12 education). 
 323.  Kowal, Hassel & Crittenden, supra note 309, at 33. 
 324.  Id. at 34. 
 325.  KATHARINE K. MERSETH ET AL., INSIDE URBAN CHARTER SCHOOLS; PROMISING 
PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES IN FIVE HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOLS (Harv. Educ. Press 2009). 
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B. If “Any Other Societal Benefit” is Acceptable, then Whose Societal 
Norms Apply, and Are Those Norms Consistent? 
Another problem with SEL is that what constitutes a “Societal 
Benefit” will vary significantly from state to state, and an incorporator can 
subvert the policies of a state by simply incorporating in a different state.   
For example, California requires benefit corporations to serve “[t]he 
accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society.”
326
  California 
recently passed legislation authored by State Senator Ted Lieu that bans 
discussion about LGBT in schools.
327
  Following the Supreme Court’s 
recent opinions Hollingsworth v. Perry
328
 and United States v. Windsor,
329
 
all lesbian and gay persons in California may avail themselves of the equal 
protection of rights under state and federal law, as least as they pertain to 
marriage.
330
  California thus appears to embrace a more modern view of 
what constitutes the accomplishment of a particular social benefit. 
Conversely, Virginia’s constitution states that: 
[t]his Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not 
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance, or effects of marriage.  Nor shall this 
Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize 
another union, partnership, or other legal status to which is 
assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of 
marriage.
331
 
As recently as 2012, strong majorities in the Virginia House and 
Senate passed legislation prohibiting same-sex couples from adopting 
children.
332
   
Also, within the past decade, the Virginia Secretary of State’s office 
 
 326.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e)(7) (West 2012). 
 327.  S.B. 1172, 2012-2013 Leg. Sess., (Cal. 2012). 
 328.  No. 12-144 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2013) (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of an 
appeal by supporters of California’s Proposition 8 after the amendment was struck down). 
 329.  No. 12-307 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2013) (holding unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause section three of the Defense of Marriage Act, which restricted marriage to 
heterosexual unions). 
 330.  S.B. 54, 2008-2009 Leg. Sess., (Cal. 2009). 
 331.  VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (Lexis, current through 2013 Reg. Sess. and 2013 Sp. 
Sess. I); see also Bill Sizemore, Effort to repeal Va. Gay-marriage ban fails in panel, 
PILOTONLINE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/01/effort-repeal-gaymarriage-
ban-fails-house-panel (describing a failed repeal effort in 2013). 
 332.  See, e.g., Chris Johnson, White House responds to Va. anti-gay adoption bill, 
WASHINGTON BLADE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/02/07/white-
house-responds-to-va-anti-gay-adoption-bill; Steve Williams, Virginia Senate Approves 
Anti-Gay Adoption Bill, CARE2 (Feb. 23, 2012, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.care2.com/causes/virginia-senate-approves-anti-gay-adoption-bill.html. 
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approved a corporation which intended to “manufacture and market[ ] . . . 
tobacco products in a way that each year kills over 400,000 Americans and 
4.5 million other persons worldwide.”
333
  However, states like California 
and New York have passed laws prohibiting smoking in a number of 
places.  
334
  As the preceding examples show, what may be socially 
beneficial in some states may also be socially repugnant in other states.   
Some level of discomfort thus arises relative to leaving what 
constitutes socially beneficial business behavior under law in the hands of 
any third party with potentially great conflicts of interest.  Simply put, what 
constitutes socially beneficial activity is highly subjective, regardless of the 
internal affairs doctrine.
335
 
C. Concerns of State and Federal Conflicts 
1. Federalism336 
This sub-part discusses a federalism concern anecdotally by 
examining two state statutes and one federal statute.  A broader discussion 
of the federalism implications of SEL relative to tax law exists infra in Part 
IV. 
Even as Colorado lobbyists once successfully repelled contrepreneurs’ 
attempts to pass SEL in the state, Colorado voters passed an initiative to re-
legalize personal use of marijuana.
337
  But California’s mix of legalized 
medicinal marijuana
338
 and SEL causes federalism concerns.  Specifically, 
California’s benefit corporation legislation indicates that a “specific public 
benefit” exists when a business organization formed as a benefit 
 
 333.  Corp. Charter, Licensed to Kill Inc., COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. 
COMM’N (Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business 
Law). 
 334.  See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6400 (West 2007) (creating the nation’s first tobacco 
smoking ban in California workplaces in 1995); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o 
(McKinney 2003) (restricting smoking tobacco in New York). 
335.   Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 with VantagePoint v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 
(Del. 2005) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 301 (1971) (illustrating that 
the internal affairs doctrine among which state law applies to a corporate action is not as 
clear-cut as some people may otherwise believe). 
 336.  This sub-part discusses a federalism concern anecdotally by examining two state 
statutes and one federal statute.  A broader discussion of the federalism implications of SEL 
relative to tax law exists infra in Part IV. 
 337.  Press Release, State of Co., Gov. Hickenlooper Signs Amendment 64 
Proclamation, Creates Task Force to Recommend Needed Legislative Actions (Dec. 10, 
2012), available at 
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251634887823. 
 338.  Medical Marijuana Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, 
http://cdph.ca.gov/programs/mmp/pages/default.aspx. 
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corporation “improv[es] human health.”
339
 In 2003, California’s legislature 
passed Senate Bill 420,
340
 which extended the Compassionate Use Act of 
1996
341
 and took effect in 2004.
342
  Senate Bill 420 re-legalized marijuana 
use in California for specific limited purposes in which a physician 
prescribes medicinal marijuana to a patient in a program overseen by 
California’s Department of Health Services
343
 and the state’s attorney 
general.  Physicians prescribe medicinal marijuana to patients who suffer 
from conditions such as AIDS, arthritis, cancer, chronic pain, migraines, or 
any other persistent medical symptom that “[i]f not alleviated, may cause 
serious harm to the patient’s safety or physical or mental health.”
344
  This 
law demonstrates that individual ownership of one’s body via 
compassionate patient treatment options serves to improve the public 
health.  But federal law conflicts.
345
 
As a result, an enterprise that appears qualified to form specifically as 
a California benefit corporation raises the question of how socially 
beneficial an enterprise may be.  By fulfilling its specific state statutory 
purpose, such an enterprise may comport completely with state-level SEL.  
However, that enterprise would not only violate federal law, but would also 
subject its customers to potential federal prosecution and imprisonment. 
2. State Law Concerns 
A recent decision by California’s Department of Aging, a branch of 
the state’s Health and Human Services Agency, demonstrates that even the 
state does not believe benefit corporations to be a beneficial entity choice.  
For example, California’s Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) 
has restricted all Community-Based Adult Service (CBAS) providers to 
non-profit status,
346
 the same status held by a B Lab-certified B Corp. 
 
 339.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e)(4) (West 2012). 
 340.  S.B. 420, 2003 Leg., 625 Ch., § 11362(h) (Cal. 2003) (enacted). 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE, §§ 11362.9 (2003) (codifying part of S.B. 420 and 
indicating an effective date of January 1, 2004). 
 343.  CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE, § 11362.71 (2013). 
 344.  Id. at § 11362.7. 
 345.  See discussion of Berkeley Patients Group, supra note 238 and accompanying text 
(referencing federal criminal law listing marijuana as a schedule one controlled substance). 
 346.  Memorandum from CBAS Branch to Community-Based Adult Services Center 
Administrators and Program Directors (Dec. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0C
DAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.caads.org%2Fpdf%2Fpdf%2Fcbas_2012_12_31_c
da_notice_provider_requirements_postponed.pdf&ei=YmJsUtbqJMWpkAehrIGQAQ&usg
=AFQjCNHabweM13xV_abV3eAIMaMBCTCikg&sig2=_pSDou7Q5Yz02faSFnsA5Q&b
vm=bv.55123115,d.eW0 (announcing that the DHCS has postponed, but not eliminated, the 
requirement that CBAS providers be restricted to nonprofit legal status). 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: HISTORY, PURPOSE, GOVERNANCE, 
TAXATION, AND SCALABILITY 
Having discussed the foundational history, purpose, governance, 
taxation, and scalability traits regarding (1) the major traditional U.S. 
liability-shielded entities; (2) L3Cs, FPCs, benefit corporations, and entities 
who pay B Lab for a certification; (3) several case studies of international 
socially focused enterprises; and (4) the smoke and mirrors behind B Lab’s 
business operations, I now turn to a comparative analysis of each trait and 
entity type.  This Part demonstrates that entities created under SEL might 
be better regulated by a state’s department of redundancy department, 
rather than by a department of corporations.  As illustrated below,
347
 and 
contrary to the contrepreneurs’ spurious assertions, nothing advanced by 
SEL negates Friedman’s proposition that companies may choose to have 
eleemosynary purposes, so long as the owners want to employ that goal. 
While many may consider Friedman to be a radical capitalist, a more 
mainstream yet “ardent libertarian” entrepreneur has demonstrated that 
large, scalable, public companies may have a social purpose.
348
  For 
instance, John Mackey founded and became the CEO of Whole Foods, a 
specialty grocer with a social mission.  Mackey indicated that his position 
was not hostile to capitalism but instead recognized that the “enlightened 
corporation should try to create value for all of its constituencies.”
349
  
Mackey indicated that Whole Foods measured its success 
by how much value we can create for all six of our most 
important stakeholders:  customers, team members (employees), 
investors, vendors, communities, and the environment . . . There 
is, of course, no magical formula to calculate how much value 
each stakeholder should receive from the company.  It is a 
dynamic process that evolves with the competitive 
marketplace.
350
 
So unlike B Lab, Mackey measures the success of his business by 
looking at multiple distinct stakeholder groups.  Additionally, Mackey 
chastised B Lab certified B Corporations because “B corporations fall far 
short of being revolutionary,” as “B corporations appear to violate the 
 
 347.  See infra tbl. 1 (summarizing the entity forms and rules regarding their governance, 
purpose, taxation, scalability and disclosures). 
 348.  Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, WHOLE FOODS, 
http://www.biology.iupui.edu/biocourses/Biol540/pdf/WholeFoodsJohnMackeySR.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Id.  See also JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING 
THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS 293-97  (2013) (critiquing as well Triple Bottom Line 
accounting’s neglect of “a wider and more nuanced view of stakeholders” and a failure to 
emphasize “purpose, leadership, management, and culture . . . .”). 
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important principle that owners should ultimately control the 
corporation . . . . The [B-corporation] system protects the management 
from owners.”
351
  Underscoring Mackey’s theoretical writings and practical 
corporate accomplishments, the following chart suggests that no legitimate 
basis supports SEL’s existence. 
 
Table 1 
ENTITY GOVERNANCE PURPOSE TAXATION SCALABILITY DISCLOSURES 
S-Corp Owners or 
Agents 
Whatever 
agreed to in 
charter. 
Pass 
through 
taxation. 
Not scalable 
beyond 100 
shareholders. 
None required but unlimited 
disclosures permitted. 
C-Corp Few 
meaningful 
rights for 
equityholders 
Whatever 
agreed to in 
charter. 
“Double 
taxation.” 
Scalable to 
publicly 
traded entity. 
None required unless 
publicly held; unlimited 
disclosures permitted unless 
securities laws prohibit. 
LLCs/LLPs Owners or 
Agents 
Whatever 
agreed to in 
charter and 
operating 
agreement. 
Check-the-
box option, 
but often 
pass-
through 
taxation. 
LLCs can 
trade 
publicly. 
None required but unlimited 
disclosures permitted. 
Int’l 
Entities 
Owners or 
Agents 
Nation-specific. Nation-
specific. 
Nation-
specific. 
Nation-specific, but see, e.g., 
South Africa, mandating 
disclosure of social activities 
for all companies, not just 
special social enterprises. 
L3Cs Owners or 
Agents – 
essentially the 
same as LLC. 
Further one or 
more charitable 
or educational 
purposes; the 
significant 
purpose of the 
business cannot 
be production 
of income or 
appreciation of 
property; 
purpose cannot 
be to achieve 
political or 
legislative 
No tax 
benefits 
and no 
pass-
through 
taxation. 
No 
scalability, 
because 
cannot have 
profit 
motive. 
None required; unlimited 
disclosures permitted. 
 
351.   Mackey & Sisodia, supra note 350. 
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purpose. 
FPCs Directors may 
consider best 
interests of the 
FPC, its 
equityholders, 
and any special 
purpose interest 
in charter. 
Charter must 
identify a 
public benefit 
purpose. 
Not 
recognized 
by IRC for 
pass-
through 
taxation. 
No limits on 
scalability 
but would 
likely need 
to 
reorganize. 
Must disclose non-financial 
info, including a specific 
MD&A section addressing 
the special purpose
352
 and 
what the FPC did during the 
reporting period to achieve 
the special purpose. 
Governance assessment may 
be conducted internally. 
Benefit 
Corps. 
Directors must 
consider 
stakeholders 
who have no 
enforcement 
rights; 
uncertain if 
directors owe 
shareholders 
fiduciary 
duties. 
Must have 
specific public 
benefit and 
general public 
benefit assessed 
against a third-
party standard; 
internal 
statutory 
tensions 
No federal 
tax benefits 
or pass-
through 
taxation. 
Scalable, 
like a C 
Corp. 
Disclosures required to third 
party-assessor, but unlimited 
disclosures permitted.  
Certified B 
Corps. 
No rules. No rules. Taxation 
follows 
entity type, 
not 
certificatio
n from B 
Lab. 
Scalability 
follows 
entity type.  
To date, no 
publicly held 
corporation 
sees a need 
for B Lab’s 
seal of 
approval. 
Only what B Lab requests in 
its questionnaire. 
 
The foregoing chart thus illustrates that no need exists for SEL.  
Current corporate entities may be governed by owners or managers, may 
possess any corporate purpose agreed to in the corporate charter, have 
understandable federal taxation regimes, are scalable, and have no 
limitations on disclosures, so long as the disclosures are consistent with 
applicable securities laws.  If all of these features currently exist, then, 
logically, why enact SEL to create new entities whose material difference 
from existing entities is a lack of accountability to the very stakeholders 
and shareholders with whom they claim to concern themselves?  If the 
 
 352.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500 (West 2012). 
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global underperformance of socially responsible mutual funds relative to 
their benchmarks is any indication of how SELs perform,
353
 then why 
create SEL and SEL-related entities that seem to ensure lower returns for 
equity investors? 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the cloak of social responsibility harms the foundations of 
a free society . . . . [T]he doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ taken seriously 
would extend the scope of the political mechanism to every human activity.  
It does not differ in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist 
doctrine.  It differs only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can 
be attained without collectivist means.
354
 
—Milton Friedman 
 
As Professor Bainbridge indicates, “[n]o one seriously denies that 
corporate conduct generates negative externalities,”
355
 and as Professors 
Page and Katz stated, “[e]very state has expressly legalized corporate 
philanthropy.”
356
  Accepting that SEL ought to exist reflects an erroneous 
assumption that business owners currently cannot contractually agree to 
receive lower (or perhaps higher) profits in the name of some greater good.  
For example, free from SEL’s mandates, conscious capitalism
357
 has 
demonstrated a robustly successful past and appears to have a bright future 
for equity holders and stakeholders alike.  Furthermore, assuming the 
general theory that economic actors respond to incentives, then the 
contrepreneurial proponents of SEL should acknowledge that the 
appropriate legislation to make businesses socially beneficent would be 
 
 353.  Luc Renneboog, The Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 
QFINANCE 5 (2013), http://www.qfinance.com/contentFiles/QF02/glus0fcl/1n/0/the-
performance-of-socially-responsible-mutual-funds.pdf (“SRI [Socially Responsible 
Investment] funds in all countries on average underperform the stock market index, and SRI 
funds in all countries on average underperform conventional (non-SRI) funds.”); see also 
Steven Goldberg, Five Great Green Funds, KIPLINGER (2008), 
http://socialinvesting.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=socialinvesting&cdn=mone
y&tm=569&f=00&tt=14&bt=0&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.kiplinger.com/columns/value/a
rchive/2008/va0520.htm (indicating that socially responsible mutual funds underperform 
traditional equity funds by 100 basis points per year). 
 354.  Friedman, supra note 11, at 123-24. 
 355.  Bainbridge III, supra note 6, at 8. 
 356.  Page & Katz, supra note 6, at 1352; see also Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02(13) 
(2010) (granting corporations general powers to do all things necessary to carry out its 
business). 
 357.  See MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 350, at 23-36 (noting that companies such as 
Whole Foods Market, Google, Panera Bread, Starbucks, and others have successfully 
utilized this model to be profitable corporations). 
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passing laws that removed liability shields from a firm’s owners and 
agents.  Such a legislative shift in the legal landscape would ameliorate 
corporate moral hazards, remove government incentives from formation 
decisions,
358
 and allow for a return to a closer form of pure market 
capitalism.  Rather than legislatively adding additional government-created 
liability shields that incentivize irresponsible and morally hazardous 
behaviors, contrepreneurs advocating SEL ought to consider focusing on 
eliminating corporate forms altogether.  Doing so, however, would not only 
be impractical, but also crippling to advocates who push the benevolent-in-
theory SEL that functions in practice as the self-creating and self-
reinforcing cottage industry of contrepreneurship. 
 
 
 358.  See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing ethically questionable 
practices associated with early corporate formation in the United States). 
